Divas Upadhyay

Abstract: Article 28 of the Indian Constitution provides for a bar against religious instruction in educational institutions. The Supreme Court in Aruna Roy v. Union of India (‘Aruna Roy’) upheld religious ‘moral and value’ education (‘RMVE’) by holding that RMVE constitutes religious education and not religious instruction. This piece, drawing on Rajeev Bhargava’s distinction between education ‘in’ religion and education ‘about’ religion, argues that RMVE constitutes religious instruction and not religious education. Additionally, this piece examines the ‘common core’ form of RMVE, upheld by Aruna Roy, which proposes that all religions have a common essence. This is advanced by delving into the Constituent Assembly Debates’ view of the Article as a ‘path of complete safety’ to avoid the teaching of dogmas, and by illustrating that the idea of a common core constitutes a dogma.

In March 2026, the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board (‘GSHSEB’) examinations included questions on the Bhagavad Gita as part of the Class 12 English language test in light of the GSHSEB having incorporated ‘value-based’ chapters from the Bhagavad Gita into first language textbooks for Classes 9 to 12 for the academic year 2025-26. The Gujarat government claimed to have based its decision on the National Education Policy (‘NEP’) of 2020, which promotes the instillation of moral values amongst the students.

Last year, Madhya Pradesh’s Chief Minister, Mohan Yadav, remarked that every school-going child must carry the Bhagavad Gita with them, celebrating the state government’s move to include the holy book in the school curricula. Uttar Pradesh went a step further and introduced summer workshops on the Ramayana and the Vedas, directing public basic schools in the state to make arrangements for the same.

A common thread that runs across these decisions, aside from the party in power in their respective states, is that they find support not primarily in the NEP but in a 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court of India (‘the Court’) and its interpretation of the scope of Article 28 of the Indian Constitution—Aruna Roy v. Union of India (‘Aruna Roy’).

Article 28 provides certain safeguards to ensure the ‘Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions’. Particularly, Article 28(1) provides that no religious instruction shall be carried out by educational institutions that are wholly maintained out of State funds. Additionally, Article 28(3) states that no educational institution recognised by the State shall compel a person to attend religious instruction without their (or their guardian’s) consent.

Aruna Roy arose when a challenge was raised against the National Curriculum Framework for School Education (‘NCFSE’) published by the National Council of Educational Research and Training. One of the primary contentions of the petition was that the NCFSE violated Article 28 of the Constitution by providing for religious ‘moral and value’ education (‘RMVE’) under the head of ‘Education for Value Development’. The three-judge bench of Justices M.B. Shah, D.M. Dharmadhikari, and H.K. Sema unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of RMVE by holding that religious instruction must be distinguished from religious education.

The Court clarified that religious instruction is the teaching of the tenets, rituals, observances, customs, traditions, and modes of worship of a religion whereas religious education has a greater emphasis on the study of religious philosophy, culture, and history. The former is prohibited by Article 28 whereas the latter is not. Aruna Roy held that RMVE constitutes religious education and is, therefore, not governed by Article 28. Additionally, while upholding RMVE as proposed by the NCFSE, the Court affirmed that such value education is not partisan in nature as the NCFSE focuses on the idea of a ‘common core’—the essence of every religion is common and it is only the practices of each religion that differ.

This piece seeks to borrow from Rajeev Bhargava’s framework on religious education to argue that an accurate interpretation of Article 28 would foreclose RMVE from its ambit. This is advanced in two parts: first, RMVE constitutes religious instruction and not religious education; and second, the common core form of RMVE as upheld by Aruna Roy constitutes a dogma.

I. The Nature of RMVE

A. Education in Religion and Education about Religion

Rajeev Bhargava, when considering whether religious education should be available in secular states, defines religious education as the thorough understanding of the cumulative tradition of a particular religion. This cumulative tradition refers to a study of the historical deposits of a religion, encompassing a study of temples, scriptures, philosophical systems, legal and social institutions, and moral codes to name a few. However, Bhargava posits a nuanced view of religious education, distinguishing between education in religion and education about religion.

Education in religion forms a part of religious instruction, wherein the primary purpose of such education is to inculcate in the child a particular faith. Education about religion, on the other hand, is education which can be grasped objectively as an outsider. A distinction between the two, therefore, would hinge on an assessment of whether education regarding the cumulative tradition of a religion can be studied in an objective manner by students who can place themselves as outsiders relative to the content of such education.

This model provides a better understanding of what ought to constitute religious instruction within the meaning of Article 28. The purpose behind making a distinction between religious instruction and religious education is not to obstruct academic study under this provision. In this light, Bhargava’s model examines the underlying nature of religious education to determine if the form of religious education truly provides for an academic study. This prevents any attempt to circumvent the protections of Article 28 by simply removing explicit forms of catering to religions such as rituals and modes of worship.

B. RMVE as Education in Religion

The Eighty-First Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on Value-Based Education (‘the Report’), which was relied upon by both the NCFSE and Aruna Roy, elucidates the workings of value-based education. The Report defines values as virtues in an individual, arguing that these values have deteriorated because of the influence of ‘Western culture’.  The goal of value-based education, including RMVE, in this light, is to engage the “minds, hearts, and hands of children in forming their own character to know what is ‘good’, love ‘good’ and do ‘good’.” The Report further discusses that these values need to be ‘implanted’ in the ‘impressionable’ minds of primary school children in a ‘subtle’ manner.

The NCFSE, with the Report as its foundation, poses a problem that Aruna Roy does not address. RMVE, as Martha Nussbaum points out, is not simply the teaching of the history of religions but teaching certain sets of norms as ‘good’ norms and ‘bad’ norms. The primary object of this form of education, as affirmed by Justice Shah, is not merely to convey information but to counter the ‘erosion of values’ so that students may inculcate these values for their decision-making processes.

RMVE, then, as a logical corollary of how value education functions, involves: first, the determination of certain religious values as ‘good’, which necessarily stem from the tenets of one or more religions; and second, ensuring that these values are communicated to students as ‘good’ and to be inculcated by them as an integral part of their character.

This is where Bhargava’s model comes into the picture. RMVE is not a form of academic study which educates the student about the cumulative tradition of a religion in their capacity as outsiders. Instead, RMVE involves the inculcation of a set of values—drawn from the tenets of a religion(s)—by the child. RMVE, therefore, constitutes education in religion, i.e., a form of religious instruction.

This becomes even more clear when the precedents relied upon by Aruna Roy are looked into. D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, for instance, was a case wherein the constitutional validity of the Guru Nanak University, Amritsar, Act, 1969 (‘the Act’) was challenged. Section 4(2) of the Act, which stated that the University shall “make provision for study and research on the life and teachings of Guru Nanak and their cultural and religious impact in the context of Indian and World civilizations”, was challenged for violating Article 28(1). The Court, here too, distinguished religious instruction from religious education. However, this provision is clearly distinguishable from RMVE as the emphasis here is on an objective academic study, as opposed to seeking to imbibe within students the teachings of Guru Nanak as ‘correct’ or ‘good’.

II. The Common Core RMVE

A. Constituent Assembly Debates

The Article, then in the form of Clause 16 and later Draft Article 22, provided for similar safeguards to the ones present under Article 28(1) and Article 28(3). The debates surrounding this Article in the Constituent Assembly (‘the Assembly’) bring to light three inferences.

First, RMVE was specifically opposed in the Assembly. An amendment to the Draft Article that sought to add the words “the State shall endeavour to develop religious tolerance and morality among its citizens by providing suitable courses in various religions in schools” was negatived by the Assembly. Additionally, B. Pocker also expressed a preference for moral education to be disassociated from religion to avoid majoritarian bias in carrying out such education.

Second, the Assembly highlighted the vast array of issues that come with attempting to comparatively teach the ‘essence’ of every religion. Purnima Banerjee moved an amendment to include a new paragraph in Clause 16: “All religious education given in educational institutions receiving Statewide will be in the nature of the elementary philosophy of comparative religions calculated to broaden the pupils’ mind rather than such as will foster sectarian exclusiveness.” This amendment too was negatived, with members expressing concerns about how difficult it is to define what the ‘elementary philosophy’ of each religion is. Importantly, B. Pocker highlighted how such an amendment seeks the unification of religions, an idea that is antithetical to other fundamental rights of the Constitution which protect the diverse character of India.

Third, and most important, this provision was meant to walk a path of ‘complete safety’. B.R. Ambedkar clarified the intent behind this provision—carrying out religious instruction which equally caters to every religion and every sect is an impossible task; this Article, therefore, avoids it entirely. He also explained that such an approach avoids any clash that may arise between the truthful character or dogmas of various religions.

Aruna Roy, while relying upon S.R. Bommai v. Union of India’s idea that the Indian state is not hostile to religion, ignores the essence of the protection provided by Article 28. The neutrality towards religion envisaged by Article 28 is not one where teaching of religions is to be carried out in an equal manner, but one where it is entirely avoided. Aruna Roy deflects arguments on religious instruction creeping in through RMVE either through the NCFSE’s assurance that all religions shall be catered to equally or through its idea that the ‘essence’ of every religion is the same. This entirely ignores the role of Article 28 as the ‘path of complete safety’.

B. Other Problems with the Common Core

The NCFSE’s common core model presents two additional issues. First, the idea that all religions have a common core constitutes a dogma, i.e., something that Article 28 prohibits. Second, the idea of a common core has the tendency to be inflected by a majoritarian bias, particularly Hinduism.

Justice Dharmadhikari elucidates the common core idea through an explanation of what constitutes religious pluralism. Religious pluralism, to him, is the view that all major faiths are different conceptions of the ‘Real’ or the ‘Ultimate’. He upholds the common core form of RMVE on the ground that such religious ‘education’ is ‘pluralistic’ and ‘inclusive’ in nature. However, the idea that every religion is simply a path to the same ‘Ultimate’ is not a neutral idea but one that remains objectionable to various religions and sects, constituting a dogma in and of itself.

Justice Dharmadhikari himself illustrates this when he attempts to outline what ‘exclusivism’ in religion would constitute. He goes on to illustrate how Christians believe that the path to salvation lies solely through Jesus, or how Muslims believe in only one God, and even certain strands of Hinduism that revere the authority of the Vedas as eternal. These strands of thought believe and assert the character of religion to be a certain way that is at variance with the idea that all religions share a common core that is the ‘Real’ or the ‘Ultimate’ and different religions are merely different conceptions of the same.

As discussed previously, B.R. Ambedkar had clarified in the Assembly that one of the primary purposes of Article 28 was to avoid a clash between the truthful characters or the dogmas of various religions. The idea of a common core does not supersede other dogmas, but presents a different dogma about what the truthful character of religion is.

Manisha Sethi illustrates, through an examination of the history of religious education in India, that the idea of a ‘Natural Religion’ akin to the aforementioned idea of the ‘Real’ or the ‘Ultimate’ has often been inflected with a bias towards Hinduism. Several processes throughout the course of India’s history have caused this: the significant presence of culturally conservative and Hindu provincial educational ministers during the initial years of India’s independence, the idea pushed by reports such as that of the Kothari Commission that indigenous and national values must repel the influence of westernization, substituting the idea of culture with the idea of moral education, to name a few.

This is most evident in Aruna Roy. Justice Shah, relying upon A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, substituted the definition of religion for the definition of dharma as outlined by the Rig Veda and the Mahabharata. Justice Dharmadhikari, too, expresses his discontent with the ability of the word ‘religion’ to convey the ‘Indian concept of religion’. He then, also relying on the Rig Veda, proceeds to define religion by reference to “what Hindus call sanatan dharma.” The common core form of RMVE, then, is not just a dogma (i.e., prohibited by Article 28) but is also one which is biased towards majoritarian tendencies.

While such bias can also influence education other than RMVE (see, for instance), the scope of this piece is restricted to moral education and does not extend to examining, for example, education concerning the history of a religion being taught as ‘authoritative’. This is because the nature of RMVE, as discussed in the preceding section, makes the issues concerning bias more pronounced. This stems, specifically, from RMVE’s role in inculcating particular values in students as ‘good’.

III. Conclusion

This piece is not against either the academic study of religion or value education as such. Education about the objective study of the cumulative tradition of a religion is constitutional and does not attract the prohibition under Article 28. Similarly, value-based education in and of itself is not what this piece seeks to contest. Value education divorced from religion can be and has been carried out. The Central Board of Secondary Education has previously, in the case of Santosh Singh v. Union of India, presented several steps taken towards moral education without invoking religious values as a response to a writ petition demanding moral science in school curricula. The NEP, too, discusses moral and value education pertaining to constitutional and universal values at great length without having to affiliate them with religion(s). It is specifically value education that is religious in nature that the piece contests.

Aruna Roy’s flawed and overly simplistic understanding of Article 28 has, amongst other things, paved the way for the introduction of what is essentially a religious text in school curricula and any challenge to the same has failed. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, for instance, in Catholic Bishop’s Council v. State of Madhya Pradesh refused the petitioner’s challenge to the introduction of the Bhagavad Gita in the curricula of government schools. The Gujarat High Court, too, in Jamiat Ulama-E-Hind Gujarat v. Union of India refused to entertain a similar challenge, going as far as to refer to the petition as ‘propaganda’ and stating that the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita are nothing but ‘moral science’. In the absence of a reconsideration of the ruling, Article 28’s safeguard remains but a dead letter.

Divas Upadhyay is a Third-Year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student at the National Law University, Delhi.