Almas Shaikh

Source: TheWire

Abstract: The Supreme Court’s decision in Chinthada Anand raises significant questions for the development of discrimination law in India. The case exemplifies, yet again, how a formalistic version of equality is still the underlying logic discrimination claims. It exposes the limits of relying on doctrinally progressive, boundary‑expanding judgments at the macro level when, in practice, equality is systematically undermined at the micro level of legal application.

What is the point of discrimination law when it does not provide protection against discrimination? This is something Indian laws will have to deeply reconsider in light of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (“Chinthada Anand”) decided on 24 March 2026.

India has always boasted of its strong equality and anti-discrimination laws. From Articles 14-16 of the Constitution to specific legislations, such as the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (PoA Act), these are enforced to combat the generational inequalities that have created a hierarchical society in India. The recent SC judgment in Chinthada Anand sheds light on the drawbacks in the current discrimination law framework. A narrow formalistic reading of anti-discrimination legislation, such as the PoA Act, undoes the objective of their existence in the first place. Using this decision as a case study, I showcase the drawbacks in the Indian anti-discrimination framework.

1. The High Court Decision

This particular story begins in Andhra Pradesh with the case of Akkala Rami Reddy & Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (Akkala Rami Reddy) which was decided on 30 April 2025 by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The 2^nd Respondent, along with his wife and son, were residents of the Pittalavanipalem Village, where he was a pastor and also conducted Sunday Prayers. [Para 2] It is pertinent to note here that by birth, the 2^nd Respondent belongs to the Hindu-Madiga community in terms of caste.

The 2^nd Respondent experienced threats and abuse on the basis of his caste starting in December 2020. He experienced physical abuse and caste slurs from the accused on 03.01.2021. However, the 2^nd Respondent pardoned the accused on account of being Christian and the love of Jesus. [Para 3] On 24.01.2021, he was accosted by the accused and 25 others who assaulted him in a manner that injuries would not be visible. Again, he was abused in the name of his caste. They threatened to eliminate him (i.e. kill him) along with his family. Two days later, i.e., on 26.01.2021, he lodged a complaint under the PoA Act and the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

It is on the basis of this complaint that the accused lodged a petition in the High Court. The crux of the petition is that since the 2^nd Respondent has converted to Christianity and is professing it, he does not qualify for the protections under the PoA Act, which are specifically for those who belong to the SC/ST community. [Para 6] The petitioners/accused in the case argued that the complaint under the PoA Act ought to be quashed. The 2^nd Respondent contended that the witnesses listed would confirm his caste location as Hindu-Madiga. Furthermore, the witnesses confirmed that the incidents were casteist in nature.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that only a person belonging to the SC/ST community could invoke the provisions of the PoA Act. Section 2(c) of the Act reads that:

• Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall have the meanings assigned to them respectively under clause (24) and clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution.

Relying on this provision along with Section 3, the Court held that only those who are members of the SC/ST group can invoke this law. [Para 19] The court relied on the witnesses to confirm that the 2^nd Respondent had converted to Christianity and was working as a Pastor for 10 years. The court then went on to typify the different types of Christians in India and in Andhra Pradesh specifically. Since the 2^nd Respondent had voluntarily converted to Christianity and was working as a pastor, he could not invoke the provisions of the PoA Act. The court held that the legislation was introduced to prevent atrocities against members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. [Para 37]

As for the allegations under IPC, the court noted that there were no corroborating witnesses for the abuse experienced by the 2^nd Respondent. The wife only turned up at the spot after the alleged altercation. The other two witnesses’ (LW3 and LW4) testimonies, which stated that there was an altercation, were not corroborated by the other witnesses. As such, the charges under the IPC were also dropped. [Paras 38-39]

With this, the court held that ‘this is a case where the 2^nd Respondent has misused the SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and filed a false complaint’. [Para 40] Furthermore, it opined that the non-cancellation of the SC/ST certificate held by the 2^nd Respondent does not grant him protection under the protective legislation. The court was of the considered view:

• that a false complaint is filed, and no purpose would be served if the petitioners are relegated to the trial Court and to undergo the rigmarole of trial. [Para 41]

2. The Supreme Court Decision

This matter was appealed and brought before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision explains the abuse faced by the appellant (the 2^nd Respondent before the High Court). The court notes:

The appellant argued that the High Court gravely erred in holding that the appellant was disentitled from invoking the provisions of the PoA Act, merely on account of his conversion to Christianity. This was because, firstly, caste is a matter of birth and not of faith, therefore conversion does not erase historical disadvantage; and secondly, that the G.O. Ms. No. 341 dated 30.08.1977, issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, stipulates that mere change of religion shall not operate as a bar to Scheduled Caste persons from securing the benefits to which they were otherwise entitled prior to conversion. [Paras 16-17]

The Respondents, on the other hand, reiterated that the appellant, by his own admission, is a Christian. As such, he cannot claim protection under the PoA Act. Relying also on Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, an argument was furthered that no person who professes a religion different from Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. [Para 20]

The question before the Supreme Court, apart from considering the correctness of the High Court decision, was to delineate the conditions under which a person who has undergone religious conversion may avail the statutory benefits granted to the members of the SC/ST community. [Para 25] Expanding on the meaning of tribe as used in Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, as well as the Constitution (Schedule Tribe) Order, 1950, the court held that a ‘person can claim benefits under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 only if he/she continues to belong to that particular tribe in substance’. [Para 30] On the question of caste, the court relied on C.M. Arumugam v. S Rajagopal, which held that:

• “A caste”, as pointed out by the High Court of Madras in Coopoosami Chetty v. Duraisami Chetty [ILR 33 Mad 67] “is a voluntary association of persons for certain purposes”. It is a well-defined yet fluctuating group of persons governed by their own rules and regulations for certain internal purposes.

The court, while interpreting Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, later went on to understand what the word ‘profess’ meant. It would mean to publicly declare or practice a religion. [Para 38] At the same time, Christianity does not recognise or incorporate the institution of caste. [Para 39] Although the appellant previously belonged to the Madiga community, his public declaration and practice of Christianity show that he indubitably professes that religion.

On the GO, the Bench elevated the distinction between statutory and non-statutory concessions. The GO, which extended benefits for SC/ST converts, would only apply to persons under the 1950 order, and not to a central legislation such as the PoA Act.

The Supreme Court further laid down seven postulates to determine if a person belongs to the SC/ST community: the claimant must demonstrably belong to a caste or tribe, should not profess any religion other than Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism; statutory benefits for SC/ST members cannot be extended to those who are not deemed to be a member of the caste; the claimant cannot simultaneously profess any other religions other than the one specified and claim membership of the SC group, and also provided three cumulative conditions to prove reconversion – including proof of original Scheduled Caste membership, credible evidence of bona fide reconversion with “complete and unequivocal renunciation” plus adoption of original customs and evidence of community acceptance. [Para 55] When it came to Scheduled Tribes, the determination could not rest on conversion alone, but ‘must turn on whether the claimant continues to possess and is recognised for the essential attributes of tribal identity, including customary practices, social organisation, community life, and acceptance by the concerned tribal community’. [Para 55]

The Court consequently ruled that the PoA Act – a special legislation – does not apply to a Christian. It also held that the High Court correctly decided on the basis of the PoA Act and the IPC.

• The submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that he continues to retain his Scheduled Caste status by birth, notwithstanding such conversion, cannot be accepted. When the postulates enunciated hereinabove are applied to the facts at hand, it becomes manifest that for a person to be recognised as a member of a Scheduled Caste, he must be professing the Hindu religion or such other religions as are expressly recognised under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Once the appellant converted to Christianity, the caste status, which he earlier enjoyed as a member of the Madiga community, stood eclipsed in the eyes of the law. [Para 56]

3. Analysis: Need for an Anti-Discrimination Framework

Discrimination legislation aims to protect people from discriminatory acts and to enforce a rule against discriminatory acts. India’s legal system has it backwards – the PoA Act is utilised to uphold a rule irrespective of whether it protects people against discriminatory acts. The pushback on this judgment arises on two interconnected levels – a socio-legal criticism of the PoA Act, and the lack of an anti-discrimination framework.

On a preliminary level, the criticism arises from the nature of the PoA Act and its enforcement within a hierarchical society like India. Much has been written criticising the judgment: that the decisions relied on a sweeping assumption that conversion eradicates the effects of caste-based disadvantage; that the court does not consider the question of dominant caste members suppressing witnesses; that by conflating the 1950 Order and the PoA Act, the court relied on administrative classification to obfuscate penal reality. In arguendo, Raj notes that even if the apex court was right in not invoking the PoA Act, the decision is used as a means to carry out injustice in the name of legality.

Additionally, denial of caste identity in cases of discrimination claims erases different facets of discrimination law. Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians experience intersectional vulnerability on the axis of caste and religion. The nature of the PoA Act makes it difficult to find protection from caste attacks. At the same time, there is no legislation to protect against horizontal religious discrimination. Azam writes that the denial of Dalit Muslims and Christians to be qualified as SC is obfuscated by a host of denials or fallacious arguments. Arshid collates quantitative data to show the overlap between caste and religion in India. Considering the demands for a caste census, it is an important legal and political question to recognise caste identity beyond the Hindu religion.

Apart from these criticisms, the decision at both the High Court and the Supreme Court makes clear how underdeveloped the principles of anti-discrimination law in India are. Much of the equality law’s development in India has arisen out of the constitutional provisions. Such development often provides protection against vertical discrimination (i.e. by States against their citizens) rather than against horizontal discrimination (i.e., discrimination between private actors). Even when there are statutes to tackle horizontal discrimination, it can be difficult to prove discrimination, as we see in the present case.

In Chinthada Anand, it was evident that even the decade-long profession of Christianity as a Pastor was not enough to escape the clutches of caste-based verbal and physical attacks. The focus rightly should have been on the permeation of caste hierarchy and logic in the Indian community, such that these caste slurs are used even today. The profession of a different religion did not protect Chinthada Anand. Contrastingly, the burden was on him to prove his caste identity – a burden so high that he would not be eligible for protection.

If the matter was brought under an anti-discrimination legislation, such as in, South Africa and the United Kingdom, it would fall under direct discrimination. Recognised specifically in the UK, such discrimination is known as discrimination by perception. The UK Government’s Equalities Office notes that discrimination by perception happens when a ‘person is discriminated against because they are thought to have a particular protected characteristic when in fact they do not.’ The objective of the legislation in such cases is to protect against any discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics, instead of a narrow version of offering protection only to those who are within the group membership.

Khanna notes that the dominance of formal equality has distorted the development of discrimination law, and specifically, indirect discrimination law. However, the current decision shows that even direct discrimination is underdeveloped within India, leaving legitimate concerns of discrimination unprotected.

Silo-ed grounds-based legislation will provide haphazard protections while ignoring intersectional cases of discrimination. Furthermore, it creates a high burden to prove marginalised group membership. Contrastingly, there is a need to shift the focus from protecting certain groups to protection against discriminatory behaviour. The goal of antidiscrimination legislations cannot be formalistic. Instead, one of the goals of substantive equality is to transform societies. This includes discouraging the discriminatory acts that arise due to stereotypes and prejudices, irrespective of the group membership of the victim.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Chinthada Anand should be used as a warning signal on the need for anti-discrimination legislation in India. Relying only on constitutional provisions does not provide protection. The absence of meaningful laws which provide remedies against horizontal discrimination leaves victims without access to justice. Attempts have been made previously to introduce an overarching equality bill in India. The Chinthada Anand decision will be a welcome addition to the Indian antidiscrimination framework only if it is used as a catalyst to revive the project for enacting antidiscrimination laws in India.

Conclusion

The verdict in Chinthada Anand should provide a pivotal point for the judiciary and the legislature to seriously reconsider their role in promoting equality to the people in India. It exposes the limits of relying on doctrinally progressive, boundary‑expanding judgments at the macro level when, in practice, equality is systematically undermined at the micro level of legal application. The rupture reveals a structural flaw: the absence of a coherent antidiscrimination framework capable of addressing intersectional harms and regulating discrimination beyond State actions. Doing so would be an important step in contributing to an over-theorised yet underdeveloped field of discrimination law in India.

Almas Shaikh is an internationally trained and India qualified human rights lawyer, currently working as an Assistant Professor in Law at the National Law School of India University. Her research focuses on equality and discrimination law, intersectionality theory, affirmative action, and constitutional design. She completed her DPhil (PhD) from the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford under the supervision of Professor Sandra Fredman. Almas possesses Bar Council Qualification to practice in India and has worked in dispute resolution.

The author also acknowledges Tvesha Chauhan (Editor, LSPR) for her research assistance.