Mihir Teja Kalle

Source: The Hindu

Abstract: This article critiques the Supreme Court’s ruling in Baboo Khan v. State of Rajasthan, where a dowry death conviction was overturned on the grounds that a demand made during a post-childbirth ceremony fell outside the legal definition of dowry. The author argues that the Court misread prior precedent, ignored established burden of proof frameworks, and adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of the law, one that undermines decades of judicial effort to protect women from dowry-related abuse.

Introduction
In a strongly worded judgment delivered on 28 November 2025, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan, JJ, in Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh, underscored the judiciary’s responsibility to respond firmly to crimes rooted in the dowry system. Expressing concern regarding judicial passivity with respect to such cases, the Bench observed:

“Judicial passivity or misplaced lenience in the face of such atrocities would only embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative – …, to send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance barbarities born out of the evil of dowry”.

Quite curiously, just a day prior to Yogendra Pal, the same bench in the case of Baboo Khan v. State of Rajasthan, set aside the conviction of an individual in a case of dowry death under section (u/S) 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 (IPC) on the grounds that a demand during a ‘Chhoochhak ceremony’, a ceremony held after the birth of a child, cannot be termed as a dowry demand, as such a demand would require that it is made in connection with the marriage. To substantiate its reasoning, the Court solely relied on Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab.

This article argues that the Court in Baboo Khan erred in its approach on three counts. First, Satvir Singh does not lay down a binding or categorical rule excluding ceremonial demands from the definition of dowry. Second, the Court failed to appreciate the burden of proof framework applicable to dowry death cases. Third, the Court ought to have interpreted the statutory provision in a liberal manner.

The Court’s reasoning in Baboo Khan

In Satvir Singh (Para 21), the Apex Court held that, even though dowry may be given or agreed to be given after marriage, it must remain in connection with the marriage of the parties. The Court cautioned against treating every payment made by in-laws as dowry, especially when such payments were made in the context of customary or social ceremonies, such as the birth of a child. On the facts of the case, the Court declined to presume that a payment of Rupees 20,000, made five months after the birth of a couple’s second child, constituted dowry without any cogent evidence of a demand ‘soon before’ the woman’s death, as required under Section 304B of IPC.

Relying on this reasoning, the Court in Baboo Khan (Para 7) laid down that the demand made for gold ornaments at the time of the ‘Chhoochhak ceremony’ cannot be termed as a ‘dowry demand’ as it could very well have been a demand that was not made in connection with the marriage itself, but rather due to the birth of the child. Hence, the Court set aside the conviction u/S 304B of the IPC while upholding the conviction u/S 498A of the IPC.

Satvir Singh and its misapplication in Baboo Khan

The decision in Satvir Singh must be read in its proper factual and doctrinal context. It was never intended to operate as a straight-jacket formula for determining what constitutes dowry. Rather, it served as a caution against the mechanical presumption that all payments made by the wife’s family necessarily amount to dowry, particularly in the absence of a proximate demand connected to the woman’s death.

The true essence of Satvir Singh lies in excluding bona fide and voluntary payments made during social ceremonies from the ambit of dowry, rather than insulating demands merely because they are articulated during a ceremony such as the ‘Chhoochhak Ceremony’. To treat Satvir Singh as laying down such a categorical exclusion of such customary payments from the ambit of ‘dowry’ would be to misread a context-specific holding as a substantive rule.

The Court in Baboo Khan erroneously applied Satvir Singh in the context of the facts of the case. Satvir Singh sought to ensure that all payments made by an in-law are not termed as ‘dowry’. It did not lay down a binding rule that even in the case of a ‘demand’ being made for such a payment, such as in the case of a payment during a customary ceremony, such as the ‘Chhoochhak ceremony’, it would not be termed as ‘dowry’. Additionally, I argue that where a ‘demand’ occurs by any of the parties mentioned u/S 2 of the DPA, then such a ‘demand’ by itself changes the bona-fide nature of a payment by an in-law or any such party and converts such a customary payment to be included in the definition of ‘dowry’ since it creates unnecessary duress on the aggrieved party to fulfil such demands due to their marital commitments.

It is important to note that in Baboo Khan (Para 2), there was a demand made for a gold ring and chain at the ceremony. Further, the demand made had a direct correlation to the death of the woman, which was not rebutted by the Court, nor by the parties in the appeal. Hence, the Court should have distinguished the case of Satvir Singh, as it does not directly relate to the instant facts and dealt with an altogether different factual situation. Further, since a ‘demand’ was raised by one of the parties, it no longer points towards a bona fide and wilful payment as part of the customary practices during such ceremonies

Rajinder Singh and the Burden of Proof Framework

Several Supreme Court decisions have called for a liberal and expansive definition of the word dowry. Especially focusing on the legislative intent behind the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DPA) and relevant sections in penal statutes such as the IPC that deal with dowry deaths.

In Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, a three-judge bench of the Apex Court overruled the ratio of Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra. In Appasaheb (Para 9), the Court had held that a demand arising out of financial stringency or urgent domestic expenses could not constitute dowry, since the demand is not for ‘dowry’ as is normally understood. The Court in Rajinder Singh (Para 20) clarified that such an interpretation of the word ‘dowry’ would be impermissible and not in line with the legislative intent of the statute. Further, that any demand made by persons covered in Section 2 of the DPA which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman would be presumed to be in connection with the marriage, unless unequivocally proven otherwise.

The Court in Baboo Khan did not take into consideration the threshold laid down in Rajinder Singh, where if any ‘demand’ has been made by either parties u/S 2 of the DPA and such a demand has a reasonable connection to the woman’s death, then it is deemed to be ‘in connection’ with the marriage unless the facts unequivocally point otherwise.

In Baboo Khan, the facts did not unequivocally attribute the demand made by the husband for gold to any other contextual circumstance other than “in connection with the marriage”; rather, the Court posited that there could have been a possibility that such a demand was made merely for the customary practices during a ‘Chhoochhak Ceremony’. Merely because a demand was made at such a ceremony, it does not lead to the definite conclusion that it is not in ‘connection with the marriage’. Hence, since the factual situation did not unequivocally prove otherwise, the demand should have been treated as a demand for dowry in connection with the marriage, therefore following the ratioof Rajinder Singh.

How the Statute should be interpreted

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra (Para 12), another three-judge bench of the Apex Court held that ‘dowry’ requires an expansive definition to ensure that an evil like dowry demands that has plagued Indian society for decades is effectively dealt with and eradicated. It added that a rigid meaning would hamper the real object of the provision. Accordingly, it held that the term “dowry” would include even a demand for the construction of a house.

Taken together, both Rajinder Singh and Jogendra are a reflection of the clear judicial commitment to eradicating dowry by adopting a purposive and socially responsible construction of the penal statute to further the legislative intent. In this light, Satvir Singh, which was concerned with limiting unwarranted presumptions on the grounds of specific facts, cannot be termed as a controlling precedent for Baboo Khan. To the extent that it has been used to define ‘dowry’ narrowly, it stands on a similar pedestal as Appasaheb and is treated as being functionally diluted post-Rajinder Singh.

Hence, another fundamental error in the Court’s approach lies in its adoption of a narrow and literal construction of the expression “in connection with the marriage”, despite consistent judicial guidance cautioning against such an approach in penal statutes that seek to tackle social mischiefs. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (Para 23), a three-judge Bench of the Apex Court categorically held that even in the interpretation of penal statutes, a narrow and purely lexical construction may not always be warranted. The objective of criminal jurisprudence is not to permit such an interpretation of law that would create a loophole for the accused to escape from the clutches of the law.

Dowry-related offences, by their very nature, seek to address a deep-rooted and systemic societal evil, especially when 2023 recorded over 6100 women killed in dowry-related deaths. Providing a get-out-of-jail-free card in the guise of a restrictive interpretation of the term dowry risks frustrating the very legislative intent underlying the DPA and Section 304B of the IPC. As was reaffirmed in the Jogendra case, the concept of dowry warrants an expansive construction that would not harm the underlying legislative intent behind such enactments.

In Baboo Khan, though, the Court opted for a rigid interpretation of the term ‘dowry’ and the phrase “in connection with the marriage” by treating the timing or ceremonial context of the demand to be a determinative feature in whether such a demand constitutes ‘dowry’. Such an interpretation is perilous as it risks future Courts excluding any demand made during such a ceremony from the scope of ‘dowry’.

Further, to ensure that there is no longer any ambiguity, the Government of India should reconsider a proposal made by the National Commission for Women that suggested changing the words “in connection with the marriage” to “given before the marriage, at the time of marriage and at any time after the marriage”. To ensure that there is no misuse of such a provision, the amendment ought to exclude bona-fide gifts or payments that are made by any such person u/S 2 of the DPA.

Conclusion

The restrictive interpretation adopted by the Court in Baboo Khan risks departing from established jurisprudence regarding both the statutory construction of penal statutes and the protective shield of dowry-related offences that have been given teeth through the DPA and Section 304B of the IPC. By confining the expression “in connection with the marriage” to a narrow and transactional understanding that excludes certain customary and ceremonial occasions, the judgment overlooks the harsh reality of dowry-related abuse, where coercion can manifest itself in different colours.  To combat societal evils like dowry that continue to pose a threat to Indian society, the Courts must take a liberal view that furthers the legislative intent, while ensuring that the reality of societal life is taken into account. Permitting offenders to escape from the clutches of the law merely due to rigid interpretations opposes the very reason for promulgating the DPA and Section 304B of the IPC.

Mihir Teja Kalle is a third-year student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal.