*Rachana Prakash and Arya Harishankar

In this episode, Professor Harsh Mahaseth joins Rachana and Arya to explore the intersections of law and human rights. They discuss the limits of LGBTQ+ decriminalisation in India and Singapore and transgender marginalisation in prisons. The conversation analyses ASEAN’s legal personality and SAARC’s role regarding internally displaced persons. Additionally, Mahaseth offers guidance on legal writing and advocates for disability inclusion within legal educational institutions.

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Rachana: In this episode, we sit down with Professor Harsh Mahaseth, a scholar of law and human rights, and the instructor of multiple incisive courses at Jindal Global Law School: ASEAN Law Policy and Governance, Critical Issues in Criminal Justice, and The Police in India. He has authored over 50 academic papers in renowned journals, blogs, and news outlets. Drawing from a blend of constitutional theory, ground-level reform debates, and lived experiences, these courses challenge students to engage critically with international affairs and criminal justice as well as environmental law in India.

Our conversation focuses on his specialization in International Law today. We explore the contradictions and possibilities within this field, drawing on his extensive knowledge to envision a more inclusive legal system. We also want to give due credit to his experience as a professor for so long, as well as an academician, and we will also try to include conversations about legal writing and general questions of inclusivity within educational spaces.

So, the first question, Professor, we have for you today is on your research on Singapore’s repeal of Section 377A. It emphasizes that decriminalization alone does not resolve the stigma and exclusion faced by the LGBTQ+ community. Given that India decriminalised homosexuality in 2018, which you’ve also written about, what parallels do you see between Singapore’s more cautious approach and India’s post-decriminalisation landscape? And how can South Asian countries move beyond legal steps to achieve this vision of substantive equality that we’ve so proudly envisioned in our Constitution?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you for your question and first of all, thank you so much, Rachana and Arya, for having me here.

To answer your question, the parallel between Singapore’s cautious repeal of Section 377A and India’s decriminalization of homosexuality that happened in 2018 – they reflect a broader regional pattern that we see, which is legal reform without full societal transformation. So, both nations demonstrate that while decriminalisation marks a vital legal victory, it does not by itself dismantle the structural discrimination, societal stigma, or cultural taboos surrounding LGBTQ identities.

Now, if we talk about the parallels that we see, in both countries the use of judicial activism was necessary. However, public opinion in both remains ambivalent or hostile, especially when we look at India as well, outside urban centers. And we do see that decriminalisation removed the threat of imprisonment, but it offered no affirmative rights. So, there’s no legal protection from discrimination in let’s say employment, education; there is no recognition of same-sex marriages.

A pathway that the question asked for – maybe I think that South Asian countries must embed LGBTQ+ rights into the political, social, and cultural fabric. For which, I think comprehensive laws explicitly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment, housing, education, etc., is required. There is a need for access to welfare schemes, skill building, and also health services, which should also include mental health as well as HIV care. And government-supported programs are required to empower trans and queer communities economically and socially.

Apart from this, of course, legalisation of same-sex marriage or civil unions as well as the right to adopt and inherit, etc., are also required. And of course, school curriculum and teacher training is also required because we do need inclusive education as well as media reform.

And I think the cautiousness of Singapore’s approach and the post-decriminalisation that we’ve seen in India, of course, highlight a key lesson: that legal reform without social and institutional transformation is fragile and incomplete. And so, in South Asia, for meaningful progress, it must be rooted in intersectional justice, grassroots advocacy, and a rights-based approach to citizenship.

I do also want to point out that this has been seen in South Asia. So, to give an example, the nation of Nepal has actually brought out several progressive – not only judgments but also legislations. So, we do see a shift happening in South Asia as well. And I just hope that this happens throughout the region.

Arya: Thank you, Professor. Along similar lines, you have also written about the social stigma faced by the transgender community in India. In particular, you’ve argued that Indian prisons have been a site for reinforcing the marginalisation of transgender persons. Could you shed light on some solutions that could potentially tackle this problem?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you for your question. So, in my research, I had written about the deep structural violence and erasure faced by trans individuals within the carceral system. Prisons as extensions of broader social hierarchies tend to reproduce transphobia, cis-normativity, and also patriarchal binaries, often placing trans persons in unsafe, isolating, and dehumanizing conditions.

So, this marginalisation manifests through multiple ways such as misgendered placement, lack of recognition for gender identity, abuse and sexual violence by inmates and staff, and inadequate medical care.

So, potential solutions to address transgender marginalisation in Indian prisons could be maybe the recognition of gender identity in law and policy. So, self-identification must guide prison placement, not anatomy or birth certificates. And we should ensure that we comply with the NALSA judgment and also the right to self-determined gender identity. And so, we need to update prison manuals and intake procedures to include non-binary and transgender options.

Apart from this, I think we need to create dedicated voluntary transgender wards where necessary without isolating or segregating forcibly. And we need to try to avoid solitary confinement as a “protective” measure. Instead, offer community-integrated yet safe environments.

Apart from this, I think sensitisation and training of prison staff – which I think should be mandatory ongoing sensitisation training for the officials. Access to healthcare and gender-affirming treatment as well as legal aid cells within prisons should be trained in handling cases of sexual violence, discrimination, or wrongful confinement of trans persons.

And so, at the heart of the solution lies the shift from this punitive, cis-normative model to one that is transformative, rehabilitative, and rights-respecting. And so, yes, I think that’s my view on this.

Rachana: Thank you for that, Professor. There’s this general idea that in academia when you’re writing papers, you don’t give solutions because nothing will really solve the problem. But I think ideating on potential solutions is very important especially when issues are this acute. And this is, I think, a great example of how we can integrate challenges that we know legally exist with policy-level ideation and solutions as well.

Moving on to the questions that we have regarding ASEAN. We’ll first talk about Simon Chesterman’s paper, “Does ASEAN Exist?”. Chesterman argues that the real question is not whether an organization has legal personality, but rather what specific powers have been granted and how those powers are used. What is your evaluation of this statement in relation to ASEAN? When regional organizations claim legal personality but lack substantive enforcement mechanisms, do they still serve a meaningful purpose in international law?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you so much. So, Professor Chesterman was actually the Dean of NUS Law when I was doing a Master’s in NUS. I think now he is the Vice-Chancellor [Provost] of NUS, I might be wrong over here, might need to fact-check that. But yes, he has shifted to a larger role. And I do remember reading his work as well. It was really great work.

So, Professor Chesterman’s observation is highly relevant to the study of regional organisations like ASEAN. I think that his research, as well as whatever you stated, this invites a deeper inquiry into the functionality of legal personality in practice, particularly in contexts where enforcement mechanisms are weak or deliberate.

So, to understand ASEAN, we need to look at Article 3 of the ASEAN Charter, if I’m not wrong, which says that ASEAN shall have legal personality. So, in formal terms, what this means is that ASEAN can now enter into international agreements, it can maintain relations with external parties, and it can have standing in legal or diplomatic matters.

Now, agreeing with Professor Chesterman’s view, despite this formal status, ASEAN’s institutional structure is deeply intergovernmental and prioritizes a consensus-based decision-making and non-interference, which is called the “ASEAN Way”. And this limits binding dispute resolution, supranational authority, as well as enforcement of obligations amongst the members. So basically, ASEAN has the form of a legal personality but not the functionality that Professor Chesterman suggests is essential for meaningful power.

Now, despite lacking robust enforcement mechanisms, ASEAN still does play a meaningful role in international law and regional governance. To give you a couple of examples, ASEAN has successfully created a regional identity and shared normative frameworks like, let’s say, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and other regional frameworks that they have on disaster management, environment, and many on economic integration. These instruments, while non-binding or weakly enforced, they do shape expectations and guide state behaviour and influence international discourse.

Apart from that, ASEAN does provide a structured forum for dialogue and cooperation as well as a foundation for economic agreements – just coming back to economic integration. So, the foundation that they have is the ASEAN Free Trade Area as well as the RCEP. And this enhances predictability, confidence building, as well as regional stability, even without the strong enforcement powers.

And when we look at soft law and when we talk about non-binding, ASEAN’s reliance on soft law mechanisms is often intentional. And why is it intentional? It’s because it reflects the diversity of the political systems, the different levels of development, as well as the historical sensitivities to sovereignty.

And so, when Professor Chesterman’s argument highlights the limits of ASEAN’s legal personality, that does not mean that the organization is meaningless in legal terms. It functions more as a normative and diplomatic actor than a coercive one. And so, if a regional organization claims legal personality but lacks substantive power, in legal terms, it may have limited capacity to influence state behaviour through binding law. But it still, in functional and political terms, can shape the regional order as well as provide legal harmonisation and also act as a convener for cooperation.

And so, while legal personality without power limits the coercive authority, it does not actually negate the legal relevance. So just to conclude, Professor Chesterman’s statement does rightfully shift attention from the symbolism of legal personality to its practical effect. In ASEAN’s case, the organization’s legal personality is more instrumental than transformative. It does enable ASEAN to engage externally and create soft law internally, but does not empower the organization to enforce obligations robustly. Yet, even without that strong enforcement, ASEAN does serve a meaningful role in international law by fostering regional norms, enhancing diplomacy and integration, and contributing to the evolution of international legal frameworks. And so legal personality is, therefore, not an end in itself, but a tool whose significance depends on how it is deployed. And I think ASEAN exemplifies both the potential and the limits of that tool.

Arya: Thank you, Professor. Now, as you’ve mentioned, despite the fact that the ASEAN’s legal personality may be more instrumental than transformative, it still has the capacity to conclude treaties on behalf of its member states. And this is what Zeida has argued in his piece, “ASEAN and its Problematic Treaty Making Practice”. Now, even though the ASEAN is entitled to conclude such treaties, questions regarding the impacts of such treaties persist. In your scholarship, you have argued that the nomenclature used in ASEAN agreements could impede the kinds of obligations that member states derive from them. Would you shed light on your recommendations to address this issue? And also, have you observed any evolution in ASEAN’s treaty-making practice in recent times?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you for the question. So, in my paper, I do argue that ASEAN’s treaty practice suffers from inconsistent and often ambiguous use of terminology, which weakens the clarity and legal force of the instruments. So, to give an example, ASEAN frequently uses terms like Declaration, Memorandum of Understanding, Framework Agreement. These are often not clearly distinguished in terms of their bindingness. And some instruments labelled “Agreements” lack binding legal obligations, while some MOUs may imply strong commitments in practice. So, this leads to several issues.

The first is the legal uncertainty about whether an instrument is actually binding under international law. Difficulty for domestic courts or parliaments to interpret ASEAN obligations as well. The erosion of external credibility when ASEAN instruments lack predictable legal status. And also, complications when ASEAN signs treaties on behalf of the member states, but state practice varies in recognition and implementation, as Professor Chen does note.

So, in my paper, I do propose a few recommendations to improve ASEAN’s treaty-making clarity and effectiveness. I think that ASEAN should develop a formal classification scheme that clearly distinguishes treaties or agreements, MOUs, or declarations. Have a proper classification which is codified in ASEAN’s internal guidelines and published as a part of its legal instruments database. Something that is quite similar to how the UN has its treaty categorization.

Apart from that, I think ASEAN should mandate registration of all binding agreements with [the UN] and maintain a publicly accessible, centralized treaty repository, which also indicates the status of the treaty, the parties, and the entry into force. I think apart from that, there is also a need for clarifying the mandate and legal effect of ASEAN’s legal personality. So, when ASEAN concludes treaties on behalf of its members, there must be a clear authorization in the constituent instrument as well as an explicit indication of whether such treaties bind all member states directly, or whether they require subsequent ratification. Currently, that is quite vague and left to inference.

Now, just coming to the second part of the question. I do think there has been some incremental evolution over the years in ASEAN’s treaty-making practice. So, I do see that there is greater legal formalism in their key agreements. So, I had mentioned the RCEP, which is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which was signed under ASEAN’s auspices. This followed clear treaty-making protocols. So, it was properly designed as a treaty, it was registered with the UN, it was accompanied by the instruments of ratification. And this shows that ASEAN can engage in high-standard treaty-making practices when dealing with its external partners.

Apart from that, it has – ASEAN agreements on digital trade, commerce, and investment have increasingly started to adopt binding terms such as “shall” or “undertakes to”. And dispute resolution mechanisms are moving beyond merely aspirational declarations. However, I also have to put a disclaimer here that while I do say that the ASEAN agreements on digital trade as well as commerce – they have a more increasingly binding terminology – this is still not seen in the other areas such as, let’s say, maybe human rights or labour migration.

So, to return to your original question that you did have, Professor Chen Zeida is correct that ASEAN by virtue of its Charter has treaty-making capacity, including the authority to conclude treaties on behalf of its member states. But for these treaties to be effective, ASEAN must also address the present issues of unclear nomenclature, legal ambiguity, as well as the weak institutional follow-through that they have.

Rachana: Thank you, Professor, for walking us through your recommendations. Moving beyond the legal personality of organizations and their treaty-making practices particular to ASEAN, your scholarship has explored the legal invisibility of internally displaced persons in South Asia. This ranges from people being displaced due to climate change issues to Rohingyas facing limitations on their rights due to the actions of state authorities. Is it possible for SAARC-based conventions to tackle this problem in the backdrop of political power struggles?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: So, this is an excellent and timely question, especially as South Asia continues to experience complex displacement driven by climate change, state-led exclusions. So, in my research on legal invisibility, I’ve argued that internally displaced persons (IDPs), especially those affected by non-international armed conflicts, statelessness, or slow-onset climate crises, often exist in legal vacuums. They’re visible to humanitarian actors but invisible to domestic law and regional policy frameworks.

Now looking at the possibility of a SAARC-based convention and its feasibility, I think it’s important to first acknowledge the deep political fragmentation within SAARC. Now, the India-Pakistan conflict has repeatedly paralyzed SAARC’s agenda. Most states are wary of any instrument that might invite external scrutiny of internal displacement caused by state action. And there’s a general resistance to supranational legal obligations, much like ASEAN.

Thus, any SAARC-based legal instrument would need to be carefully drafted to respect sovereignty, framed in non-confrontational development-oriented language, and also be flexible enough to accommodate diverse legal systems and levels of political will.

Now despite these constraints, a regional framework is both possible and also necessary. But it might not look like your normal, let’s say, Western-style binding treaty. So, to give an example, the research that I had done was on the Kampala Convention and how SAARC can make a model similar to that. So, I do think that the Kampala Convention, which is of the African Union for IDPs, is a good model. It balances state sovereignty with humanitarian principles.

SAARC also shows that it can adopt soft law conventions addressing human security and vulnerable populations. Out of the very few SAARC agreements that we do have, we do have two of them which are on promotion of child welfare as well as combating trafficking in women and children. And so based on the Kampala Convention and these precedents we see, I do think that built upon this, we can develop a SAARC framework for the protection of IDPs.

Now the design for this, and if a SAARC-based convention is to work, it should first be non-confrontational and development-oriented as I mentioned. So, it needs to frame displacement as a development or climate adaptation or humanitarian coordination issue, not as a political or security threat. Second, I don’t think it should necessarily be a binding treaty at first. It could begin as maybe a regional declaration with optional protocols. And then it could rely on soft law with progressive legal commitments.

And more importantly, I do think that it needs to emphasize that all SAARC countries face similar threats: floods in Bangladesh, the glaciers melting in Nepal, the drought in Pakistan, the coastal loss in Sri Lanka. We need to use this shared risk as a unifying basis for regional cooperation, bypassing these sovereignty sensitivities.

So, a SAARC-based convention cannot actually solve displacement on its own, but I do think that it can create the beginnings of regional legal visibility, offering a normative baseline, facilitating cooperation, and also shaping long-term legal reform.

Arya: Thank you so much, Professor, for shedding light on the normative impact that SAARC-based conventions would have if, you know, we take them as a starting point and work towards a more inclusive future.

Now, moving back to a question that’s more about the formal treaty-making practices that we mentioned earlier. Your work also provides insights into international taxation and investment treaties. India’s retrospective taxation amendment in 2012 was received unfavourably. It led to a slew of arbitration proceedings against India under various laws. The Taxation Law Amendment in 2021 sought to dilute the impact of the levy on indirect transfers by nullifying its retrospective applicability. This has been welcomed as a positive change. How does retrospective taxation relate to Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) clauses in the international investment regime?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you for your question. This was the one arbitration paper that I had written with a colleague of mine and it is quite an interesting and important topic.

So retrospective taxation intersects significantly with FET and MFN clauses in BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties), both of which aim to ensure a predictable and non-discriminatory investment environment.

So, the principle of FET embedded in most BITs includes obligations such as legal stability and predictability, protection of legitimate expectations, non-arbitrariness, and due process. Retrospective taxation by its very nature undermines these protections. When states impose tax liabilities on investors for transactions that were legal and compliant under the law at the time they occurred, they disrupt the investor’s legitimate expectations.

In cases like Vodafone and Cairn, tribunals found that India’s 2012 retrospective tax amendment violated FET by creating legal uncertainty, applying laws arbitrarily, and targeting foreign investors in a discriminatory manner. So, such measures were seen as grossly unfair and violative of due process, especially when administrative actions appeared premeditated or selectively enforced.

Now, the MFN clause also ensures that a host state does not treat investors from one country less favorably than those from another. In investment arbitration context, differential enforcement or exemptions of tax liabilities can amount to a breach of MFN. To give the example, let’s say if one foreign investor is spared enforcement action while another faces asset seizure under the same law, this unequal treatment may trigger MFN violations.

India’s retrospective tax amendment, followed by its inconsistent application, opened it to such MFN claims. Tribunals often viewed this selective enforcement as undermining the standard of non-discrimination promised under BITs.

And so, the 2021 Taxation Laws Amendment Act, it did attempt to nullify the retrospective effect of the 2012 law. While this was a welcome policy reversal, its effectiveness is quite limited as international obligations had already been breached. So, compensation was awarded in cases like Cairn, and India’s credibility as an investment destination had already suffered.

So retrospective taxation, when applied without transparency or uniformity, it directly clashes with the core principles of FET and MFN in international investment law. The 2021 amendment was a necessary corrective measure, but it also highlights the need for clear treaty drafting and predictable regulatory conduct in maintaining investor trust.

Rachana: Thank you for that detailed answer, Professor. Given that it’s a matter that’s been so heavily litigated and so much of arbitration literature in the past couple of years have covered this, we’re very excited that you were able to cover it in this podcast today.

Moving on to some of the questions that we had about legal writing and educational spaces in general. You’ve published over 50 academic papers and you teach an elective called “The Art of Legal Writing”. From your extensive experiences both as an author and editor of legal journals, what are the most common pitfalls you see in legal scholarship today? How do you identify genuine gaps in existing literature to be able to contribute meaningfully to legal discourse?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you. This is an important question and one that resonates deeply with both my academic as well as editorial roles. So, over the years, through publishing and peer-reviewing legal scholarship, I’ve observed several recurring pitfalls that diminish the clarity, originality, or impact of legal writing. I’ll just briefly try to list down a few of them and then I’ll move to the second part of the question which was on how to identify the genuine gaps.

So, common pitfalls in legal scholarship do include, I think, one of the major ones being the surface-level engagement with existing literature. So too many papers either they merely summarise existing views without critiquing or extending them, or they cite canonical texts without situating the current work in an ongoing scholarly debate. And it’s very important that good legal scholarship doesn’t just cite literature, it also tries to enter into it with a conversation.

Apart from this, a very important point after this is also the lack of structure. So even brilliant ideas can be buried in confusing structures. And so, it is important to have a clear roadmap. A reader should always know what the argument is, where it is going, and why it matters. For which I think it’s very important to have, in the introduction itself, you clarify what the thesis is. You do not have abrupt transitions between sections. And you do not over-use footnotes without clarity in the main text, and you also don’t under-use footnotes because there will always be citations.

And I think one that has been emerging in the past few years quite rapidly is the over-reliance of the use of AI. So, everyone uses AI and I’m not going to say that it isn’t wrong to use AI. But I think it is important, and you need to understand how to use it and not to let AI do everything. You can’t expect ChatGPT to write a paper for you. However, that being said, I always do make this statement that there are certain ways that you can use ChatGPT to help you with the research, but not do the entire paper for you. There is a particular way, and also you need to understand the extent and limitations to the use of AI. So, I do think it’s very important that students understand this.

Now as for how I identify genuine gaps in legal literature, this is something that I have emphasized in my course, as you mentioned, “The Art of Legal Writing”, as well as numerous guest lectures that I usually give around this topic. So, I teach my students to approach originality methodically. So, there is a step-by-step way of doing this.

How do you do this? The first step is you start by mapping, not by writing. What does this mean? This means that before you draft anything, you try to make a matrix of the recent literature. At least try to find a few of them on the topic. Identify each work’s methodology, thesis, opinion, conclusion – try to find all of that. And then ask: what are these works assuming, omitting, or not resolving? I always lead with the question that I have after reading a paper and then trying to see if it has been answered or not in that paper itself. And I think that’s very important that while you’re reading a paper, you need to see whether there are any questions that are coming in your mind and try to note them down and then again go back to the scholarship and see whether they’ve been answered or not.

The second, after that step, would be to interrogate the edges of this existing framework. So that means that you try to look for the grey zones over here and try to trace issues that sit at an intersection of disciplines. Because most of the topics now are not really within one domain. So, these gaps often appear where frameworks intersect or under certain new developments.

Third, after this, would be to think about the timing and the context. So, by timing, you have to look at when the paper was published. And then also look at: is there a recent case or a treaty or a geopolitical shift that hasn’t been analysed yet? Or is there a new lens that has not been used by the author that you need to apply to this scholarship?

And apart from that, I think then you ask yourself: why does this argument matter now? What I mean by this is, whom does this affect? Does this affect scholars? Does this affect courts? Does this affect policymakers? And what would be lost if this question remained unaddressed? This is something I think you mentioned as well when we were looking at a question above – I think Rachana, you mentioned this – that it’s very important to understand what the recommendations or the suggestions could be. If there are none, if it does not affect anyone, then I don’t think that that is something that needs to be looked into. You need to find something that is relevant for any party and then work on that.

So, if you can answer these questions – whom does it affect and what would be lost if this question remains unaddressed? So, if you can answer these questions convincingly, you likely will have a valuable research contribution.

Arya: Thank you so much, Professor, for giving us a detailed response that I think both Rachana and I, and the listeners of this podcast, will take forward with us – not only for legal writing and our coursework, but also in general on how to think about a legal issue and how to ensure that we aren’t simply recycling an argument that has already been said multiple times.

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Unfortunately, I can’t give you a very detailed answer to this because, as you noted as well, I have an entire course on this. So, we do take a very long time to deconstruct this entire in its entirety. So, for a short answer, hopefully that is more than enough. But of course, whenever the time comes, I would always be happy to discuss that in more detail later on.

Arya: Thank you, Professor. No worries at all.

Our final question in this podcast is also something that goes back to our conversation on inclusivity, but this is something that is more close to our hearts and our experiences, which is about legal [educational] institutions particularly. Based on your observations during your years as a student as well as a professor in law school, you have written about the various forms of discrimination that students face in law schools, with an emphasis on the exclusion faced by students with disabilities. It is unfortunate that such discrimination persists in institutions that claim to be the pioneers of social justice and equality. In what ways must higher educational institutions transform to become more inclusive?

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: So, you’re absolutely right to highlight the contradictions between the values that higher educational institutions profess – equality, justice, diversity – and the persistent barriers that many marginalised students, particularly those with disabilities, continue to face. From a scholarly as well as institutional perspective, transforming law schools and broadly higher education into truly inclusive spaces requires a systemic, proactive, as well as intersectional approach.

So of course – before I start, this also does come with a disclaimer that quite a few law schools in India have been working towards these changes. Over the past decade when I have been visiting different law schools, I have seen many law schools actually start doing quite a few of these things that I will be talking about.

So, a few key dimensions in which I think transformation must occur is:

First, that most institutions focus on individual accommodations rather than addressing the built-in inaccessibility of their systems. So, they provide special exam rooms, they provide note-takers. However, they don’t address the built-in inaccessibility. For this, I do think that course materials, teaching methods, and assessment should be designed from the outset to be accessible to all. As well as classrooms, libraries, as well as online platforms must meet basic accessibility standards.

Apart from this, law schools often valorise rigid, adversarial, and hyper-competitive modes of teaching that are not inclusive of different cognitive and physical ways of learning. Now for this, I do think that we need to try to at least offer diverse modes of assessments as well as establish structured programs to support disabled and neurodiverse students academically and professionally.

Apart from this, disabled students often feel invisible or stigmatised, especially when disability is not seen as a part of the diversity agenda. For which I do think that we need to ensure that disabled people are visible not only in students but also in faculty, leadership, case studies, guest speakers. We need to promote campaigns that challenge ableist language and assumptions in legal education and discourse. And we also need to support student-led disabled student associations and peer networks.

And finally, I think that diversity policies often exist on paper but lack enforcement, funding, or even clarity. So, I do think that there is a need for, first of all, data collection and transparency. I think the last survey I remember might have been the IDIA survey that happened quite a few years back. Apart from this, I think that institutional leadership must treat disability inclusion as a core strategic priority, not an optional initiative. And I do think that legal compliance should be a floor, not a ceiling. What I mean by that I think is that we need to go beyond the basic compliance with disability laws and we need to aim for best practices.

Rachana: Thank you, Professor, for giving us another base to sort of do this imaginative thinking on in terms of the kind of policies that would have a real-life impact on ensuring educational spaces that we see every day and the values of inclusivity and accessibility that we espouse every day translates into real-life lived experiences of people who are our peers and who are part of our cohorts.

With that, we come to the end of the podcast episode. Thank you so much, Professor, for taking the time out and giving us such an in-depth, thoughtful episode and for giving us so many things to take away and think about on our own time. It was an absolute privilege and pleasure to have you.

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you so much both to Rachana as well as to you as well, Arya. Thank you so much for inviting me on this, as well as the entire LSPR team. And hopefully, through this conversation – I’m not saying that this is the end of it and that these are the suggestions and directly you go and work on it – but at least I hope that we can start with or at least continue the conversation and take it forward and work towards changes not only in the area of, let’s say, disability rights but also in the other areas that we have spoken about today. So, thank you so much for having me and it was a pleasure talking to both of you.

Rachana: Thank you, Professor.

Prof. Harsh Mahaseth: Thank you.