Ananya Garg

This article examines how Section 23 operates in the fragile space where family, property, and care intersect and sometimes fracture. By reframing parental assurances, detrimental reliance, and revocation through the equitable remedy of proprietary estoppel, it reveals how Indian elder-law jurisprudence demands a recalibration, one that embeds proportionality to prevent new injustices born of over-corrective protection.

Introduction 

The Indian legal system bases itself in an intricate balance between providing statutory stability while still leaving room for equitable flexibility, ensuring the law remains responsive toemerging socio-legal dilemmas. Appraising §23 of TheMaintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior CitizensAct, 2007, (‘Act’) to this standard, reveals certain shortcomings in its usage and application. While embracing the maxim “Equity follows the law”, it empowers senior citizens to revoke property transfers if transferees, who are often their own children, fail to provide for their basic caregiving needs following such a transfer, but its absolutist application risks transgressing another equitable principle, “Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy”. It doesn’t provide redressal for circumstances where the child who, lured by recapitulated parental promises such as, “Care for me, and this house is yours”, abandons their career, invests in the improvement of the property, only to face revocation over subjective claims of emotional neglect and abandonment. An examination of the recent trends adopted by Indian courts would reveal an intent to stretch the protection accorded under the section by reading vague terms like “basic amenities” or “love and affection” as implied conditions attached to such transfers. With multiple judgements treating §23 as inviolable, the equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel is sidestepped asstatutory entitlements are preferred at the cost of unjust enrichment. This expansive view ends up skewing the Act’s intended liberal objective of elderly wellbeing, as it enables them to weaponise the cancellation tool in inheritance disputes, by favouring one heir or using it as a means of reversing gifts in instances of domestic conflict. This article aims to probe into the Indian judiciary’s silence on proprietary estoppel on its operation as a partial shield to award compensation for detrimental reliance and not to block legitimate parental claims of neglect. The scrutiny investigates the extent to which equity can temper statutory harshness without replacing it, and encourages tailored remedies and legislative change to enshrine equitable discretion, without undermining the rightful legal rights of the elderly.  

Reconciling Proprietary Estoppel With Section 23: Equity As A Corrective Framework

The doctrine of ‘Proprietary Estoppel’, serves as a cause of action in the hands of a promisee facing a detriment arising out of his reasonable reliance on clear assurances made to him by a promisor. Invoking this principle as grounds to restrict retransfer of properties to the senior citizen under §23 requires careful reconciliation of its equitable character with the statutory fiction that deems failed maintenance conditions as fraud or undue influence. The absolutist construct of the provision requires the senior citizen to establish that the transfer was made subject to maintenance conditions, and that the transferee refused or failed to provide such amenities. The courts have restricted their scrutiny to this binary approach, one that reduces the grant of revocation relief to a determination of whether maintenance covenants existed at the time of transfer, failing to clarify the implementation nuances which go beyond these simplistic conditions while dealing with complex real-time relationships, often based on recapitulated oral reliances.

Under the principle of “Equity follows the Law”, the same is recognised to have a supplementing role rather than serving as a means to supplant the law, the integration of proprietary estoppel rests on consideration of other equitable literature. If law confers certain rights, it should provide means to vindicate and maintain the same along with awarding suitable remedies to rectify the injury caused in its employment. Importing this reasoning to the rigid application of the section requires paying attention to the wrongs affecting the transferee in need of redressal, to prevent its application from creating new injustices that the legislature could not have intended. Further, reading the corollary maxim of “Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy”, demands intervention precisely in circumstances where legal rights exist but adequate remedies remain absent with children investing substantially in property or foregoing careers based on parental assurances, only to face complete revocation.

As the development of equity is based in countering unconscionable insistence on strict legal rights, estoppel can be recognised despite tacit promises, similar to the reading into actionable implied conditions under the section. Using the doctrine to close the promisor’s mouth when the promisee has altered his position in detrimental reliance, the requirement of fulfilling the criteria of representation, reliance, and detriment, places appreciable legal standards to harmonise the remedy of estoppel within the framework of the section rather than contradicting its essence of welfare. The proportionate application of the doctrine helps keep statutory rights in check when unfairness takes over, making appraising of estoppel to deter frivolous or vindictive §23 claims while preserving genuine avenues for seniors to secure care. 

As the court is cast with the discretionary responsibility to apply the doctrine in a flexible manner for the prevailment of justice between the parties, awarding compensation for home improvements, career sacrifices, or other quantifiable impairment rather than simply voiding transfers entirely, preserves the protective intent of the Act while preventing senior citizens from unjustly enriching themselves by falling short in acknowledging the transferees’ contributions. Indian courts can peruse the remedial sophistication developed under the English jurisprudence where an assessment of detriment is carried out without offsetting the countervailing benefits. It ensures that children’s care contributions have a compensatory mechanism, through liens or monetary equivalents, which would go systematically undervalued otherwise. Indian jurisprudence has generally subsumed proprietary estoppel within the broader framework of promissory estoppel, missing the distinctive features that make proprietary estoppel particularly suitable for property-related disputes involving adverse reliance.

Judicial Expansion, Familial Feuds, And The Risks of Opportunistic Deployment

The increasing importance of carving out remedial provisions to compensate the transferee is more so significant due to the inconsistent judicial reasoning that can be traced while interpreting §23 to include conditions based on “love and affection” impliedly rather than requiring them to be stated expressly in the transfer instrument, creating occasions for opportunistic deployment in family property disputes rather than genuine cases of elderly neglect. Decisions such as S. Mala v. District Arbitrator, thread the expansive boundaries of the provision’s application. They hold against the requirement of maintenance conditions to be explicit by advocating for love and affection as implied considerations, holding property transfers as legal acts made with the hope of being cared for in old age, which effectively transforms every family property transfer into a conditional arrangement subject to retrospective reinterpretation. Further, even providing maintenance doesn’t bar the elderly to seek eviction of their children from the said property, casting an even wider net of ostensible relief available to them based on subjective claims of emotional care.

In contrast, a line of restrictive jurisprudence is exemplified by Karuppan v. District Collector, wherein the court refused to award cancellation in the absence of explicit maintenance conditions, declining to read affection impliedly as it would detract from the statutory text itself. Such varied interpretations emerge from the stance of the Supreme Court advocating in Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, that the beneficial legislation must receive a liberal construction in consonance with the objects it seeks to serve, amplifying the tension between protective intent and potential overreach. With the judgement’s failure to provide for corresponding safeguards against manipulation, the same has opened doors for subjective assessments of family relationships to override objective considerations of actual maintenance provision that the subsequent decisions have criticized. 

Courts have time and again stressed on the aim of providing maintenance under the Act rather than serving as an instrument to revoke valid gifts arising out of property disputes. The judiciary has become aware of the increasing trend of systematically abusing the welfare provision by using it as a tool to settle disputes between heirs, showcasing how the summary procedure can facilitate manipulation. On the pretext of elderly abuse this pathway of revocation is seen as a readily available mechanism to reverse transfers when inheritance expectationsare deferred, leading to the exploitation rather than protection of elderly statutory rights.  Even though there is a bar on admitting pleas for deciding the title over the property by invoking §23, still the practical effect of liberal interpretation often involves precisely such title determinations, with maintenance serving merely as the legal fiction justifying property redistribution.

As proprietary estoppel focuses on unconscionability, mandating compensation rather than absolute revocation can help address situation where the transferee is able to demonstrate the existence of definite parental assurances on which he relied to make career sacrifices or improvements in the property and faced subsequent detriment. Herein, unjust enrichment becomes manifest, as transferor benefits against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience, requiring the judiciary to fulfil its obligation and commitment to offset it. As the doctrine is applied in a discretionary and proportionate manner while awarding compensation, legitimate interests of both the parties are taken care of. 

Having realised that rigid application of individual provisions can create broader injustices, the court in S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, harmonised competing reliefs between the Act and Domestic Violence Act, both grounded in principles of equity, providing support for integrating proprietary estoppel to prevent unconscionable consequences, but the judiciary missed a key opportunity to introduce preventive guidelines against abuse. If the emphasis of the scrutiny shifts from merely establishing whether affection conditions are impliedly included to a principled equity based inquiry into good conscience, coherent outcomes can be achieved while still preserving its welfare function in genuine neglect cases.

Towards Proportionate Remedies: Embedding Equitable Discretion In The Statute

The courts currently follow a binary approach by either granting complete revocation or no relief at all, there exists a need for remedial innovation to be accommodative of complex situations of reliance that family relationships entail, in a manner than doesn’t take away from the Act’s protective ethos but also prevents unconscionable outcomes. In order to achieve a balance between legitimate maintenance interests of the elderly and reasonable expectations of the transferee, explicit recognition of equitable remedies based on the court’s discretion in the architecture of the statute itself is desirable. In lieu of declaring the transfer void, provision for alternative remedies in the form of monetary compensation, partial property rights, or structured maintenance arrangements can be awarded if the court deems them to be just and equitable in the circumstances where complete revocation would constitute unjust enrichment. This flexible approach to acknowledge the legitimate expectations of parties without total dispossession facilitates the courts to provide tailored compensatory solutions for lost expectations when property transfer is inevitable due to breach of the welfare provision.

Proprietary estoppel can be applied in a proportionate manner without diluting the Act’s liberal scheme of elderly aftercare if strict evidentiary thresholds are implemented to prevent frivolous and spurious claims. Adoption of a three stage test of assurance, reliance and detriment, as developed in English equity jurisprudence through Walton v Walton and later crystallised by Lord Walker in Thorner v Major,  in itself sets a rigorous standard wherein clear proof of foregone opportunities, expenditure incurred in making substantial property improvements, or extension of caregiving based on specific parental assurances, needs to be placed before the court. Promotion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can help in de-escalation of family feuds that are currently weaponising the Act as equity prefers consensual resolution rather than adversarial judgments. Drawing on abovementioned Commonwealth precedents, courts could hold estoppel-based compensation to coexist with §23, confronting the criticism that recognising proprietary estoppel might enable transferees to avoid legitimate maintenance obligations. Where senior citizens demonstrate genuine neglect, complete revocation remains appropriate. The current system’s vulnerability to manipulation through subjective “love and affection” claims suggests that principled estoppel analysis would enhance rather than undermine tribunals’ capacity. It will provide them with the rationaland force to identify opportunistic exploitation, ultimately restoring §23’s credibility as a protective mechanism. By equipping the courts with such powers, an assurance of no new categories of unconscionable harm being created can be reached as the provision will no longer be available for misuse as an instrument of family property manipulation.

Conclusion

The bringing in of the Act is well-intentioned on the part of the legislature in their pursuit of elderly care, but due to its institutional vulnerability in the current interpretative paradigm, it is enabling unconscionable outcomes by serving as a potential manipulative instrument in family property disputes, requiring equitable remedies such as proprietary estoppel to intervene. Providing reliefs based on such claims will lead to an evolutionary refinement which doesn’t take away from the construct of §23. It will pave the way for striking a balance between statutory supremacy and equitable justice. Anincreasing judicial trend of giving an expansive reading of the section can be traced in the recent times that favour the senior citizens.As maintenance conditions arising out of love and affection are seen as implied for practically all transfers invoking the provision, the equitable remedy of estoppel, in compliance with the objective three-element framework for admission of such a claim, is required to accord protection from opportunistic property disputes masquerading as welfare concerns. As the Indian jurisprudence already recognises remedies against unjust enrichment and compensation based on detriment like promissory estoppel, a distinct equitable remedy awarding a cause of action as provided for in English precedents is a logical extension keeping in mind that the current §23 interpretation paradoxically undermines the very elderly protection it purports to advance. The maxims “Equity follows the law” and “Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy” need not operate in tension when properly understood and applied in the circumstances at hand as the courts themselves decline the section’s infallible nature by steering towards achieving intergenerational justice while maintaining fidelity to all parties to the dispute. Establishing recourse in genuine cases of detrimental reliance in furtherance of parental assurance in no way undermines the purpose of maintenance of the elderly. As complete revocation still serves as the correct remedy for neglect, it merely ensures that the statute reflects the realities of familial relations. By harmonizing statutory welfare objectives with fundamental equity principles, proprietary estoppel’s integration within §23 can restore the delicate balance between law and equity that defines India’s jurisprudential tradition.

Ananya Garg is a 4th-year law student at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata.