*Diksha Singh

(Source: Judicature – Duke University)

Section 273 mandates that evidence be recorded in the presence of the accused, embodying the right of confrontation, namely, the accused’s ability to see, hear and cross-examine witnesses directly. Psychological research shows that direct face-to-face testimony can retraumatise survivors of sexual violence, undermining both their dignity and the reliability of their evidence. This paper argues that shielded or remote testimony, with full rights of cross-examination preserved, can meet statutory and constitutional mandates. Drawing on Article 21, precedents and comparative jurisprudence, it proposes a trauma-sensitive interpretation of section 273.

Indian criminal procedure has long valued the accused’s right to confrontation as a safeguard against injustice, embedding it in Section 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”). The logic is straightforward: directness and openness in evidence-taking foster fairness. The law commands that witnesses testify before the accused, in person, so that nothing is hidden and everything can be challenged. The right is significant as it enables the accused to observe the witness’s demeanour, to test credibility through cross-examination, and to ensure that the prosecution’s case is not built on untested or secret testimony. But in recent years, as our understanding of trauma and dignity has deepened, longstanding rules have started to look less like guarantees and more like obstacles especially in trials for sexual offences.

For survivors, the courtroom is rarely a neutral stage. The very act of testifying, often in view of the accused, may become a painful replay of past violations. Section 273 is important for confrontation, ensuring openness, credibility and fairness. As the psychological research repeatedly shows that such confrontation risks aggravating trauma and compromising the reliability of testimony. The harm is twofold: survivors face “secondary victimisation,” where the trial process itself compounds past injury, and the truth-seeking function of the trial is weakened by fragmented or inconsistent testimony.

Yet the law is slow to respond. Even after the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of “presence” through technological mediation in State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful B Desai, these innovations remain unevenly applied, leaving many victims to navigate the old adversarial theatre unchanged.

At stake is not merely procedural efficiency but the constitutional promise of dignity, protected by Article 21 and reinforced in judgments like Maneka Gandhi and Nipun Saxena. When survivors are forced into direct confrontation, the experience often reactivates symptoms of trauma – anxiety, dissociation, or inability to narrate events coherently. This not only causes further psychological harm but also distorts the very testimony the court depends upon, making it fragmented or inconsistent. The harm is thus twofold: the survivor’s dignity is compromised, and the truth-seeking function of the trial itself is weakened. If the confrontation requirement can be met without direct personal presence, the law must seriously consider when and for whom it should require physical confrontation at all. This paper proposes a path forward: the adoption of a statutory presumption in favour of shielded or remote testimony, triggered by clinical assessment, for sexual assault survivors at risk of retraumatisation.

The first section examines the doctrinal evolution of confrontation under Indian criminal procedure. The second turns to constitutional guarantees of dignity and fairness as interpretive anchors. The third explores psychological research and practical effects of trauma on testimony. The fourth engages with comparative jurisprudence and international best practices. The final section synthesises these insights to propose a trauma-sensitive reinterpretation of Section 273.

I. Doctrinal Foundations and Judicial Interpretation

Section 273’s text is stark in its clarity that evidence “shall be taken in the presence of the accused.” The adversarial system has long treated this as a pillar of fairness and transparency. That approach enjoys judicial endorsement. State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh, among other cases, reiterates how confrontation facilitates ‘truth-finding’ and guards against abuse. The abuse here refers to the risk that the prosecution might present evidence that the accused does not have a chance to test, or that convictions might rest on unchallenged or secret testimony. Presence ensures that witnesses can be cross-examined, their demeanor observed, and inconsistencies exposed. Without such safeguards, criminal trials would tilt heavily in favour of the state, raising the spectre of wrongful convictions. The Court’s insistence on confrontation was thus apt, because it tied the fairness of trial directly to the ability of the accused to face and test the evidence against them. Physical presence was presumed necessary not just for form’s sake, but also to ensure that cross-examination is real and effective.

However, shifting realities have required a more adaptive reading. The importance of technological innovation, as recognised in Praful Desai, is no longer theoretical; the Supreme Court has accepted that testimony via video conferencing satisfies the statutory requirement so long as the defense can observe and challenge it properly. This reflects a movement away from literalism toward substance – what matters is meaningful participation, not mere proximity.

Still, the benefits of this flexibility have not reached sexual offence trials in practice. Instead, many survivors continue to face the prospect of giving evidence in person, risking further trauma. This persistence of physical confrontation is not only at odds with modern technological capacity but also with the constitutional imperatives now associated with Article 21. The gap between judicial possibility and procedural reality creates a structural disadvantage for survivors, a gap the law must address.

Recent jurisprudence has underscored the decisive role of survivor testimony. Courts have long held in cases such as State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and reaffirmed in Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, that a rape conviction may rest solely on the cogent and confidence-inspiring testimony of the prosecutrix, even absent medical corroboration. The policy underlying this doctrine is not trauma-sensitivity but the recognition that requiring corroboration would systematically discredit survivors. Section 273’s confrontation rule, by contrast, safeguards the accused by ensuring that testimony is tested openly. The argument here is not that the rationales are identical, but that sexual offence cases have already been treated as warranting procedural adjustments to protect survivors. This trajectory makes comparative jurisprudence and precedents such as Praful Desai instructive, showing how technology-enabled procedures can reconcile fairness with dignity.

Psychological research lends further weight to calls for reform. Experts agree that trauma can disrupt memory, communication, and composure. When these effects take hold in court, traditional confrontational methods do not enhance reliability; instead, they undermine it. The adversarial process only works when witnesses are able to speak freely and clearly, conditions too often lacking when victims are subjected to direct confrontation. Courts have already recognised this in other ways as in Deepak Kumar Sahu, for instance, the Supreme Court reduced the burden of corroboration precisely to ensure that survivor’s testimony, even if fragmented or unsupported by medical evidence, could still be given decisive weight. This reflects a broader judicial pattern of diluting procedures that aggravate trauma in order to make space for the survivor’s voice within the trial.

The question, then, is less whether Section 273 should accommodate trauma-sensitive alternatives than how and when it should do so. It is no longer tenable to insist that physical presence is essential in every case.  The traditional insistence on presence rests on two things: firstly, seeing the witness directly allows the accused to observe demeanour and secondly, open confrontation deters fabrication by ensuring nothing is hidden from scrutiny. These values are real, but they are not absolute. In practice, the supposed gains of physical presence often come at an extraordinary cost: forcing survivors into direct confrontation reactivates trauma, producing fragmented or incoherent testimony that undermines reliability more than it protects it. The best case of physical presence is outweighed by the worst case of retraumatisation. A doctrine that values fairness must adapt to support all parties accused and survivor alike in a manner consistent with both truth and dignity. Trauma-sensitive procedures achieve this balance: they preserve opportunities for effective cross-examination while eliminating the means that, however well-intentioned, cause severe and avoidable harm.

Yet, if physical presence is treated as an inflexible requirement, the provision risks clashing with constitutional ideals of fairness and dignity. This takes the debate from the realm of statutory text into constitutional principle.

II. Constitutional Balance: Dignity, Presence, and Fairness under Article 21

The constitutional dimension of criminal procedure in India is impossible to ignore. Article 21 has evolved far beyond its minimal origins as a barrier against arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty. Through pivotal decisions like Maneka Gandhi, the Supreme Court reimagined Article 21 as a repository for substantive rights among them, dignity, privacy, and procedural fairness. The influence of this jurisprudence can be felt most acutely in the treatment of survivors during criminal trials.

Nipun Saxena is especially instructive here. The Court recognised that the trauma of sexual violence is compounded when survivors are exposed to public scrutiny and forced into direct confrontation with accused persons. Dignity becomes not a vague abstraction but a concrete right, requiring courts to adjust procedures so that victims are not re-victimised by the very process meant to vindicate their wrongs. The doctrine of “fair trial”, which protects the dignity of the victims, thus grows to accommodate both defendants and complainants, a process echoed in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India when the Court weaved privacy into the tapestry of fundamental rights.

International practice further reinforces the need for such balance. In Doorson v Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found that measures shielding vulnerable witnesses can be consistent with fair trial rights, provided there are effective means of cross-examination and judicial oversight. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Maryland v Craig, held that closed-circuit testimony for child abuse victims did not offend confrontation principles, provided the defendant’s counsel retained the ability to cross-examine. These examples show that exceptions already exist for vulnerable witnesses and for child victims of abuse. Yet, outside these exceptions, the insistence on physical presence remains crucial because it is seen as the baseline guarantee of transparency, allowing the accused to directly observe the witness, test credibility, and prevent secret or one-sided evidence, making it essential for maintaining public confidence in the openness of criminal trials.

Legal theorists have long argued that the adversarial process must adapt to lived realities. Mirjan Damaška, for instance, warns that excessive reverence for procedural ritual can undermine substantive justice. The criminal process, he writes, must not subordinate the search for truth and human dignity to mechanical confrontation.

By reinterpreting “presence” to include technological means, the Court acknowledged that the spatial formality of confrontation need not be absolute. Nevertheless, there remains a reluctance within the system to generalise these accommodations for survivors of sexual offences. The result is a disjuncture: while the law has begun to move, practice lags behind constitutional ideals and psychological science. The costs of this lag fall squarely on victims. Without adapted procedures, survivors are compelled into direct confrontation that often reactivates trauma, silences or fragments their testimony, and diminishes their ability to present a coherent account. In this way, when procedures lag behind constitutional ideals and psychological science, dignity suffers, and justice risks becoming superficial.

A trauma-sensitive criminal process, then, is more than a concession; it is a constitutional necessity. Statutes and rules must actively build in presumption and procedure so courts are not left to address these harms piecemeal. Aligning confrontation with dignity by way of shielded testimony or clinical assessment is not simply preferable but constitutionally required.

However, constitutional reasoning alone cannot fully explain why rigid confrontation undermines dignity. The lived experience of survivors, captured by psychological research, reveals why trauma sensitivity must be integrated into procedure.

III. Psychological Insights and Empirical Foundations for Trauma-Sensitive Trial Practices

The confrontation requirement, though doctrinally rooted in fairness, must be understood in light of the psychological realities encountered by survivors of sexual violence. Adversarial processes traditionally presuppose witnesses are not influenced by testifying, able to deliver coherent, linear narratives on demand. Such an assumption has repeatedly been contested by contemporary trauma science, revealing the profound impact of trauma on memory, speech, and emotional regulation.

Psychiatric research shows that trauma impairs encoding and retrieval of memories, generating fragmented or incomplete recollections, and causes survivors to experience intense anxiety, dissociation, and speech difficulties during testimony. These effects are not indicators of deception but expression of trauma’s neuropsychological imprint. For survivors, courtroom confrontation with an accused may trigger or reactivate these symptoms, leading to garbled testimony and increasing the risk of unjust verdicts.

A recent study of Indian sexual assault survivors identified more than fifty percent met diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) during trials, with increased symptoms when witnesses were required to confront the accused. These findings suggest that expecting survivors to testify under such stressful conditions without accommodation is not only an “ethical shortcoming” but a procedural flaw. Evidence procured under re-traumatising conditions is more likely to be perceived as unreliable or incoherent, ironically undermining the search for truth that confrontation aims to promote.

While it is true that criminal proceedings are often stressful and anxiety-inducing by their very nature, but Section 273 goes further, as it institutionalises direct face-to-face confrontation, a requirement uniquely capable of reactivating trauma in sexual assault survivors. Unlike ordinary trial stress, this trauma is not temporary; it risks entrenching psychological harm and silencing the survivor altogether. The question, then, is not whether courts can eliminate all discomfort from criminal proceedings, but to what extent they are willing to recognise and mitigate the distinct and irreversible harm caused by rigid adherence to physical presence. A process that ignores the psychological state of the individual may meet the letter of the law, but it falls short of the Constitution’s promise of dignity and fairness in substance.

The Court’s argument in Deepak Kumar Sahu also chimes with psychological research into trauma and testimony. By maintaining that survivor testimony can continue to be credible even in the lack of corroboration, the Court indirectly recognised that truth can find expression in terms which refuse adversarial expectations of coherence. Trauma studies account for why: survivors can be challenged by fragmented memory or breakdown of narrative under pressure of direct confrontation. Remote or shielded testimony thus does not weaken truth-finding; rather, it enhances it, in that the survivors can testify in an environment that reduces retraumatisation.

Yet two important concerns remain. First, the credibility of such testimony may be challenged, particularly where the court cannot rely on traditional cues of demeanour or where the process is seen to dilute the rigour of confrontation. Second, when testimony occurs outside the immediate, physical supervision of the court, questions arise about the possibility of external influence. Can it be assumed that the witness speaks freely merely because they are in a more comfortable position? Without adequate safeguards, the very adaptations designed to protect survivors may risk creating doubt about reliability.

The phenomenon of “secondary victimisation,” where survivors are further harmed by the legal process itself, has also been widely studied. Scholars such as Campbell emphasise that adversarial courtroom processes can cause new harms, from emotional distress to social stigma, particularly where procedures compel open confrontation or public revelation. This reality poses important questions regarding how procedural rules, such as Section 273’s confrontation requirement, could be reformed to avoid these harms without sacrificing fairness.

International guidelines and best practices increasingly advocate for trauma-informed procedures, recognising that accommodating survivors’ needs leads to more reliable testimony and greater participation in the justice process. Shielded testimony, use of screens, and remote video evidence are among measures designed to reduce retraumatisation. Empirical data from jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and Australia demonstrate that these accommodations do not compromise the fairness or efficacy of trials but rather enhance the quality and consistency of victim evidence.

In the Indian context, however, several constraints complicate the enforcement of trauma-sensitive procedures. On the practical side, trial courts across the country suffer from uneven infrastructure, with rural courts in particular lacking stable internet, audiovisual equipment, or private spaces for shielded testimony. On the doctrinal side, the judiciary has traditionally emphasised open court proceedings and face-to-face confrontation as essential safeguards against fabrication, treating physical presence as a way to prevent tutoring or false testimony. Defence counsel frequently raise objections that remote or shielded testimony diminishes their ability to conduct effective cross-examination, since observing body language, hesitation, or immediate reactions is considered crucial to testing credibility. There is also a fear that such accommodations, if extended too broadly, may tilt the process against the accused and undermine the presumption of innocence. These objections are reinforced by the absence of uniform procedural rules, leading to inconsistent application, uncertainty for trial courts, and grounds for appeal. Finally, cultural norms around honour, shame, and credibility continue to sustain judicial reluctance to alter the traditional adversarial structure.

In India, statutory protection for child witnesses under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POCSO) includes provisions for some protective measures yet the same sensitivity for adult survivors remains largely discretionary and incomplete. The lack of explicit, assessment-based presumption for trauma-sensitive arrangements creates inconsistency and uncertainty. This problem is compounded by intersectional realities: adult survivors from marginalised caste and class backgrounds often face heightened stigma in courtrooms, where credibility is implicitly tied to social status. Gender amplifies this disadvantage, not only in cases of sexual offences but also in situations where women testify against powerful perpetrators in contexts of domestic violence, workplace harassment, or custodial abuse. For such survivors, the absence of statutory safeguards means that retraumatisation is not merely an individual psychological risk but also a structural inequity, where existing vulnerabilities are reproduced within the justice process itself.

It is here that clinical expertise needs to become part of the procedural regime. Adding evaluations by experienced mental health specialists to determine risk for trauma would give courts a dispassionate reason to authorise shielded or remote testimony under Section 273. Such assessments would move the decision away from judicial discretion alone and root it in scientific evaluation of survivor wellbeing. This responds not only to the constitutional promise of dignity under Article 21 but also strengthens the trial’s truth-seeking function: testimony delivered in conditions that minimise trauma is more coherent, consistent, and therefore reliable. Calls for embedding mental health evaluations in judicial processes have been made repeatedly, including by the Law Commission of India in its 172nd Report, as well as in international best practices that emphasise trauma-informed justice. Integrating such expertise would ensure that the justice system does not inadvertently sacrifice reliability and fairness at the altar of rigid procedure.

If psychology demonstrates why adversarial confrontation can damage truth-telling, comparative practice shows that other jurisdictions have already modified confrontation to protect both dignity and fairness. These examples offer models India can draw upon.

IV. Comparative Law and International Experience

Understanding how other jurisdictions balance the confrontation requirement with trauma-sensitive protections provides valuable insight and guidance for India’s evolving criminal procedure. International legal systems have understood that vulnerable witnesses, especially victims of sexual crimes, need special procedural accommodations to safeguard their dignity without encroaching on the right of the accused to a fair trial.

The United Kingdom pioneered legislative reforms with the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which introduced a presumption in favor of special measures designed to protect vulnerable or intimidated witnesses. These encompass screens to avoid visual contact with the accused, evidence provided through video link, and accompaniment persons in court. The Act required that vulnerability assessments by expert professionals should determine the use of special measures. Empirical studies assessing such reforms reported enhanced psychological well-being of witnesses, lower attrition rates, and clearer, more consistent testimony without prejudicing the defense’s ability to cross-examine. Translating this model to India would require that similar clinical evaluations be conducted to determine the extent to which a survivor is fit to be physically present in court. If an individual is deemed unfit for direct confrontation, the impact on the trial would not be to exclude their evidence but to channel it through trauma-sensitive alternatives, thereby preserving the evidentiary value of testimony while ensuring procedural fairness.

Australia’s Criminal Procedure Acts in different states, for instance in New South Wales (Criminal Procedure Act 1986), also institutionalise trauma-sensitive accommodations. Provisions of law mandate courts to take into account clinical assessments and allow remote or video testimony for complainants in sexual offences. Evidence from Australian jurisdictions indicates that such provisions increase access to justice for survivors, with judicial oversight serving to guarantee procedural fairness and defence rights being protected as well.

In Canada, the enactment of the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and related provincial legislation specifically acknowledge victims’ dignity as central to justice. Legislative models permit evidence by closed-circuit television or other support for vulnerable witnesses, with courts having authority to balance impact on fairness against victims’ needs.

While foreign precedents illustrate workable models, the Indian context requires locally grounded solutions. The Law Commission’s recommendations and legislative gaps show where adaptation is urgently needed.

India’s response to trauma-sensitive testimony is disparate in contrast. The POCSO Act 2012 has special provisions for child witness measures, such as video evidence and in-camera trials. However, adults, who make up most complainants of sexual assault, do not have such express statutory safeguarding. The Law Commission of India, in its 172nd report, urged reforms echoing these comparative precedents, recommending measures such as mandatory shielding based on clinical evaluation of trauma risk. The Commission’s proposal recognised that the justice process itself could compound harm, and therefore sought to build safeguards directly into statutory procedure. Yet, more than two decades later, these recommendations remain only partially realised. They have not been translated into a comprehensive legislative framework or uniform procedural rules, leaving courts to improvise on a case-by-case basis and survivors without consistent protection.

The comparative context shows that trauma-sensitive processes do not decrease the integrity or adversarial nature of proceedings if carried out with necessary safeguards. Rather, they are a proof of a more mature understanding that confrontation is a tool to an end the pursuit of truth and not an end in itself to be pursued fanatically or blindly.

For India, these global examples provide a model for aligning constitutional protection with contemporary procedural fairness and clinical insight, inculcating trauma sensitivity as the norm instead of the exception.

Still, reports and recommendations remain fragmented without binding procedural change. The challenge, then, is to translate these insights into enforceable rules that courts can apply consistently.

V. Legislative and Procedural Reform Proposals

The road from jurisprudential understanding to courtroom practice continues to be blocked by the lack of clear, enforceable law. In the absence of congressional direction, courts’ discretion differs, and victims’ encounters become determined more by judicial temperament than repeated principles.

In order to fill this gap, legislative reform must enact a statutory presumption that trauma-sensitive accommodations take precedence where a competent clinical evaluation warrants that face-to-face physical confrontation will produce psychological harm or compromise testimonial credibility. This would turn the present default on its head, presuming physical presence except in cases of extraordinary cause, affirmatively prioritising survivor well-being and dignity.

Specifically, amendments to Section 273 CrPC and allied procedural provisions in particular, Section 327 dealing with in-camera trials should incorporate the following elements:

1. Clinical Assessment Trigger: The court should appoint accredited mental health professionals to assess the complainant’s trauma and advise on the appropriateness of shielded or remote testimony. Assessments would be conducted early, ideally before recording chief examination, to guide procedural planning.
   
   
2. Presumptive Shielding: Upon certification by the clinical expert that direct confrontation poses a risk of psychological harm, courts shall order special measures such as screened courtrooms, video conferencing, or voice distortion technology. The burden shifts to the prosecution or defense to rebut the presumption based on clear, cogent reasons.
   
   
3. Fairness Safeguards: To preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial, accommodations must ensure real-time cross-examination ability, observation of demeanor, and immediate judicial oversight. Courts should have the discretion to tailor measures to individual cases, but must provide reasoned, reviewable decisions in case of refusal.
   
   
4. Confidentiality and Privacy: Procedural rules must protect the complainant’s identity and testimony from undue exposure by regulating media access and maintaining confidentiality, reflecting Article 21 dignity guarantees.

5. Capacity Building: The legislature should authorise resources for creating a national roster of qualified forensic mental health professionals and train judicial officers in trauma-informed trial conduct.

6. Monitoring and Reporting: A system of annual reports documenting the use and effectiveness of trauma-sensitive measures will foster accountability and continuous improvement.
   
   

Such reforms find resonance in the Law Commission’s past recommendation, whose calls for victim-centered procedural changes have yet to be fully implemented. Globally, the success of similar statutory schemes such as in the UK’s Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 or Australia’s Criminal Procedure Acts provides a tested framework for balance and fairness.

Critically, these reforms do not diminish the accused’s confrontation rights but rather adapt their exercise to the realities of trauma, strengthening the evidentiary process and ensuring justice is both done and seen to be done.

Indian criminal procedure stands at a crossroad, to remain tethered to a rigid past or advance toward a more compassionate, effective future that honors both fair trial principles and dignity of survivors.

VI. Addressing Counterarguments and Conclusion

Critics may argue that relaxing the rigid physical confrontation requirement threatens to undermine the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial, an indispensable constitutional protection. The contention is that viewing and hearing witnesses firsthand in court is essential to determining credibility and maintaining transparency. On this perspective, trauma-sensitive accommodations might lead to a slippery slope that compromises adversarial rigor by protecting witness testimony too heavily.

These issues deserve serious consideration. However, empirical experience and legal practice in those jurisdictions that have implemented trauma-sensitive approaches are not supportive of these conclusions. Studies out of the United Kingdom and Australia repeatedly find that shielded or remote testimony maintains the essential elements of confrontation while limiting witness distress and enhancing evidence reliability. The defense of the accused remains sound since cross-examination is done in live time with judges having an opportunity to scrutinise testimony and demeanor closely.

Additionally, the Supreme Court itself stated in Praful Desai that physical presence is not the sine qua non of confrontation and that progressively developed technology can be used to guarantee fairness. Likewise, constitutional safeguards under Article 21 require a procedural regime that upholds human dignity and psychological well-being in conjunction with adversarial protection. The balancing act does not require zero-sum trade-offs but calls for sensitive accommodations.

A further argument is that trauma-sensitive procedures would place undue burdens on courts or victims by making scheduling more complicated, raising costs, and causing possible abuse. Procedural reform indeed involves making changes to systems, but the value in better participation, less secondary victimisation, and better evidence quality is sufficient to justify these. Deliberate regulatory control, standardised protocols, and judicial training will mitigate implementation challenges, as shown in international models.

Thirdly, certain skeptics are concerned with the evidentiary impact on jury or judge attitudes of novel modes of testimony. Still, courts are presented daily with expert evidence, scientific summaries, and hearsay exceptions without undermining integrity. Sheltered testimony is yet another accommodation based on legal realism and new science that merits judicial guidance to properly direct factfinders.

In summary, the requirement of confrontation under Section 273 CrPC captures deeply embedded principles fundamental to criminal justice. However, evolving conceptions of trauma, constitutional assurances of dignity under Article 21, and judicial flexibility launched in Praful Desai together necessitate a rebalancing of this right in sexual assault cases. Creating a statutory presumption of trauma-sensitive testimony accommodations based on clinical assessment honors both accused rights and survivor dignity, while improving the fairness and efficacy of trials.

India is poised to become a partner among peer jurisdictions in harmonising its criminal justice system with modern realities through reflective procedural reform. This kind of reform is not watering down rights but enhancing justice, a justice that realises, safeguards, and heals.

*Diksha Singh is a third-year student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal.