Legislation and Government Policy

National Sport Board: Opening the Field for Sports Bureaucracy

*Professor (Dr.) Lovely Dasgupta



The National Sports Governance Act, 2025 introduces the National Sports Board to oversee recognition, transparency, and compliance of National Sports Federations. While aiming to reform opaque governance exemplified by the AIFF case, its powers remain constrained by international autonomy, raising doubts whether it strengthens accountability or entrenches sports bureaucracy.

Introduction:

The National Sports Governance Act 2025 (‘the Act’) is touted as a game-changer. It is only a month old at the time of writing, as it came into force on 18th August 2025. To facilitate the effective implementation of its objectives, the Act has provided for three new sports regulators. Accordingly, as per the Act, there will now be the National Sports Election Panel, the National Sports Tribunal, and the National Sports Board. Of these, the provisions relating to the National Sports Board (‘the Board’) deserve special attention.

The National Sports Board: Power and Role

As per the Act, the Board is empowered to recognise or de-recognise any National Sports Federation. Additionally, the Board is empowered to enforce transparency in the governance of the various National Sports Federations. Accordingly, the Board is empowered to maintain a register comprising the details of all the recognised National Sports Federations and their state affiliates. The Board is also empowered to grant or cancel the registration of the affiliates of the National Sports Federations along with to conduct enquiries, constitute an ad hoc administrative body or direct the National Sports Body or its affiliates to constitute such an ad hoc body. The Board is also expected to guide the National Sports Federations in formulating the Code of Ethics. The Board shall also oversee that the National Sports Federations comply with the mandates of the Olympics and the International Federations. The Board is mandated to coordinate with the International Sports Federations, as well as the National Sports Federations, for sports development. It is empowered to frame a Safe Sports Policy aimed at protecting vulnerable groups like women and minors. These powers thus enable the Board to regulate the governance of the National Sports Federations. The organisation and structure of the Board is broadly comprised of the Chairperson, members and office bearers. The details about tenure, eligibility and other terms and conditions will be prescribed in due course by the Central government. 

The Central government thus has indirectly taken over the control of the governance of the National Sports Federations. This is further evident from Chapter IV of the Act. Chapter IV prescribes the modalities that the Board will follow for recognising or de-recognising a National Sports Federation or its affiliates. It is important to note that each such act of recognition or de-recognition has to be in accordance with the mandate of the concerned International Federation and the International Olympic Committee. This gives the impression that the Board is to act merely as an agent of the International Federations and the International Olympic Committee. It forces one to question the rationale of creating the Board. A National Sports Federation is to act with transparency and follow the directions of the International Sports Federation both in letter and spirit. In such a situation, unless one looks at the current state of governance within Indian sports, the rationale of the Board might not be clear. For such an overview will enable one to fathom the need for legislative intervention. The sports bureaucracy, hence, gets legitimised due to the failings of the existing sports system itself.

Governance within Indian sports- A Messy Affair

Unfortunately, as will be evident from All India Football Federation v Rahul Mehra (‘AIFF case’), governance in Indian sports has been opaque and arbitrary. Previously, the President of the Wrestling Federation of India (WFI), Mr Brij Bhushan Singh, was charged with sexual harassment. This led the wrestlers to sit-in protests demanding his resignation. The United World Wrestling (UWW), the International Federation, suspended WFI on the grounds of a lack of elections and a governing body.

Probably in order to pre-empt such a situation, the Board has been given the power to conduct an inquiry into the functioning of the National Sports Federations. This leads to the question as to the extent such an inquiry will be objective and free from bias. In the Indian context, this is pertinent due to the influence of political parties. As the WFI controversy involving Mr Brij Bhushan Singh shows, powerful political personalities can jeopardise an impartial enquiry. Further, section 10 of the Act clearly provides that any decision to suspend the National Sports Federation will be taken only upon consultation with the International Sports Federation. Again, in view of the experiences and controversies with sports governance, politics decides the outcome. Hence, one has to wait and see whether the Board can withstand the political pressure and force transparency in governance. Political pressures, as seen in the case of Mr Brij Bhushan Singh, have the potential of hijacking any inquiry. Any such abdication of the process to be followed by the Board will then defeat the Act. The AIFF case further affirms the apprehension about the efficacy of the Board.

The AIFF case involved a challenge to the election process of the governing body being in violation of the National Sports Code 2011 (‘the Code’), as was in force. The Code, amongst others, required that every recognised National Sports Federation should have “an exhaustive written Constitution in unambiguous terms providing for its efficient functioning, in particular, election of office bearers…”. The validity of the elections to the offices of the AIFF was challenged by Rahul Mehra vide interlocutory application C.M. No. 19815 of 2012. In 2016, the Delhi High Court stayed the AIFF’s elections that were due. Subsequently, though the elections were held, the results were set aside. The Court then nominated Dr S.Y. Quraishi, the former Chief Election Commissioner, to conduct the elections. Additionally, the Delhi High Court directed the amendment of the AIFF Constitution in compliance with the Code. On appeal, the Supreme Court of India appointed Quraishi and Mr Bhaskar Ganguly, former Indian captain and international football player, to act as the Committee of Administrators (CoA). They were entrusted to frame the AIFF Constitution. Later, Mr Justice Anil Dave, retired judge of the Supreme Court of India, was included in the CoA. However, this interim measure impacted AIFF and Indian football, since FIFA, on 14/08/2022, suspended AIFF due to the lack of an elected governing body.

Eventually, on 2/09/2022, AIFF got an elected governing body. However, the governing body was handicapped since the amended Constitution had yet to be approved by the Supreme Court of India. On 2/05/2023, the Supreme Court of India entrusted the task to Mr Justice L Nageswara Rao to vet and finalise the Constitution. This process went up to 25/03/2025, with AIFF and other stakeholders recording their objections, observations and comments. From 25/03/2025 to 30/04/2025, the Supreme Court of India heard all the parties, including the AIFF. On September 19th 2025, the Supreme Court of India approved the amended Constitution and directed the AIFF to adopt the same. Thus, from 2017 to 2025, it was a prolonged battle to instil the norms of transparent governance within AIFF. It has to be seen to what extent there will be transparency and efficiency in the governance of Indian football under the aegis of the new AIFF Constitution. In the context, the role of the Board will be tested too. Since it has currently been entrusted with the overseeing power under the Act. The Board has the power to inquire, suspend and take other measures for ensuring compliance.

Though the AIFF case exemplifies the mess that Indian sports governance is in, the Board may find the going tough. The drafters of the Act are aware of the same, for section 11 (1) clearly recognises the hierarchy within the sporting world. Hence, irrespective of the powers conferred on the Board to intervene, sub-section 1 of section 11 states that “In the event of loss of the international recognition of a National Sports Body, the normalisation process shall be implemented as per the International Charters and Statutes and the Board shall not interfere in such process”. This statement epitomises the dilemma that is faced by the National Governments across the world. Since the International Sports System runs on the concept of autonomy, it’s difficult to tame them through municipal laws. Hence, the decision of the Board to recognise or de-recognise, suspend or revoke the suspension would have come to nought. Hence, as mentioned above, the Act throughout requires the consent of the International Federations and/or the International Olympic Committee, vis-à-vis the Board’s exercise of powers.

Conclusion-Sports Bureaucracy

In the AIFF case, the Supreme Court of India voiced its opinion that “it is not appropriate to have continuous monitoring of a sports federation by any forum, including the Supreme Court.” (¶94). This statement presents the dilemma of Indian sports. The spirit of sport, touted as the philosophy underlying the concept of fair play, upholds the autonomy of the sports governing bodies. The fifth principle of Olympism, engraved in the Olympic Charter states that “…sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality. They have the rights and obligations of autonomy…freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence…”. The opinion of the Supreme Court of India, as quoted, embodies this principle. Hence, any kind of oversight, even if it is through government-authorised bodies, is barred. Hence, the Act had to tread cautiously while devising the ways and means through which the Board can have a role to play in the governance of Indian sports. However, the one aspect that the drafters willingly want to ignore is that sports governance has to be from within. 

In other words, if the sport is not governed properly by the stakeholders, then no external forum can ensure that it is done so. The predecessor of the Act, the 2011 Code, had been in force for fourteen years. And during these fourteen years, there have been numerous controversies arising from mismanagement and lack of transparency in sports governance. The oversight of the government was there even under the Code. The Act has created structures and a chain of command to be followed amongst the different regulatory bodies, as created under the Act. The point then is to what extent the creation of sports bureaucracy helps transform the existing system. One will be cautious at this stage to critique the Board. However, irrespective of the provisions of the Act that list out the role of the Board, it will be the International Federations and the International Olympic Committee that will have the final say. For the present, however, it appears that the Act has opened the field for sports bureaucracy.   


*Professor (Dr.) Lovely Dasgupta is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Centre for Sports Law and Policy at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences.