*Ria Mishra & Aakash Batra

The National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“NSGA”) represents India’s first statutory framework for regulating sports governance, replacing the executive-driven National Sports Development Code, 2011. The Code, lacking legislative force, created a regulatory limbo with inconsistent enforcement, judicial interventions, and unresolved questions regarding recognition of federations, applicability of the Right to Information Act, and the balance between autonomy and accountability. NSGA introduces mandatory recognition for sports bodies, streamlines governance obligations such as transparent elections, ethics codes, grievance mechanisms, and safe sport policies, while centralising oversight under the newly established National Sports Board. However, the Act narrows RTI access to organisations receiving direct state funding and grants sweeping executive powers to the Union, raising concerns of overreach, international censure, and reduced autonomy. The paper evaluates whether NSGA meaningfully resolves long-standing issues in Indian sports governance, while cautioning that its success will depend on balanced implementation and independent oversight.

Before the promulgation of the National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“NSGA”), the sporting bodies in India, viz. the National Sports Federations (“NSFs”), were in regulatory limbo, awaiting reforms through the enactment of a sports governance legislation that saw various iterations since 2011, i.e., in 2013, 2017 and 2024. The National Sports Development Code, 2011 (“Code”), the predecessor of NSGA, albeit a compilation of the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (“Ministry”), never saw the light of day as an enacted piece of legislation. The Code laid down guidelines regarding, inter alia, age and tenure limits, athlete representation, and transparent elections, with discretionary penalties for non-compliance by recognised sports bodies including de-recognition. However, the Code carried no statutory force and enforcement was at the behest of the Ministry, with non-compliance often flying under the Ministry’s radar, sanctions being applied inconsistently, and federations continuing operations despite being out of step with the Code.

Yet, the judiciary began enforcing the provisions of the Code, and an array of cases followed where the judiciary held that compliance with the Code is a ‘sine-qua non for grant of recognition to an NSF and the corollary access to benefits which flow from such status’. This resulted in a regulatory grey zone with multi-pronged issues at the core: first, inconsistency and lack of consensus on whether the Code, which was in the nature of executive orders, could be made mandatory; second, NSFs could carry on with their operations without complying with the governance standards introduced under the Code, by avoiding recognition; third, aspects related to the applicability of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI”); and lastly, balancing act between autonomy and accountability. This article takes a closer look at whether NSGA successfully addresses these issues that existed in sports governance under the erstwhile regime.

Mandatory Recognition: The New Norm

NSGA affords statutory recognition to certain categories of sports organisations, coupled with rights and duties imposed on entities that register with the National Sports Board (“Board”) under any such category. NSGA defines sports governing bodies, specifically the National Olympic Committee, the National Paralympic Committee, the NSFs, and the Regional Sports Federations established under Section 3 of NSGA, as National Sports Bodies (“NSBs”). Further, Section 8 of NSGA grants the Board power to recognise sports organizations as NSBs.

Let’s take the example of NSFs – while all NSFs that are recognised by the International Federation (“IF”) will qualify to be an NSB as per Section 3, only those NSFs that the Board recognises as NSBs would be considered a “Recognised Sports Organisation” as defined in NSGA, for all practical purposes. This leads us to an important question – can an NSF qualify to be an NSB but refuse to seek recognition from the Board, akin to how the Board of Control for Cricket in India (“BCCI”) has operated as the NSF for cricket without seeking recognition from the Ministry under the old regime?

The answer to the above lies in the fine print. Section 27 of NSGA pertains to “Use of National Names and Insignia” and includes two key conditions that provide clarity on this specific question. First, only recognised NSBs are permitted to ‘use the name “India” or the name of any State or district in India, or conduct any sports trials, tournaments, or events’ – things necessary for an NSF to field teams at national and international fora. Second, for any person to represent India or any State or District in India in any sports trials, tournaments or events of designated sports, authorisation from an NSB/ its affiliate is mandatory.

The above conditions, coupled with the fact that NSGA prescribes only one NSF for each designated sport, clarifies that permission to use the name “India”, conduct trials, tournaments and events, as well as the right to grant authorisation to represent India, would vest with the same entity, which would have to be a “recognised” NSB.

Going back to BCCI’s example, BCCI would be permitted to use the term “India” when fielding teams in international events and authorise cricket teams to represent India, only if it seeks recognition from the Board – making it mandatory in effect for BCCI to seek recognition, something it successfully avoided in the past.

What Does this Mean for NSFs?

This brings us to the impact of NSGA on NSFs. NSFs, including ones that would be deemed to have Board recognition, will have to put on their compliance hats and get to work to start building the internal governance structures that NSGA envisages. Apart from the requirement of seeking recognition for NSFs that are currently not recognised by the Ministry, core obligations for all NSBs, including those recognised by the Central Government before commencement of NSGA, include periodic renewal of recognition, adoption of a code of ethics, transparent elections with age and tenure limits for office-bearers, and restructuring of executive committees, constitution of ethics committee and dispute resolution committee. Federations must also implement safe sport policies, set up robust grievance-redressal systems, disclose conflicts of interest, and file annual audited accounts.

Oversight will no longer rest with the Ministry but with the newly constituted Board, which has been vested with powers to monitor compliance, review recognition, and even suspend or derecognise defaulting bodies.

The RTI Carve-out

One of the most debated aspects of the new regime for NSBs is the applicability of RTI. Crucially, the version of the Bill that was passed in the Lok Sabha on 23 July 2025, and NSGA that received President’s assent on 18 August 2025 are glaringly distinct with respect to RTI. Section 15(2) of the Bill stated that every recognized NSB would be considered a public authority under RTI. However, NSGA clarifies unequivocally under Section 14(2) that only those NSBs that receive government grants or financial assistance will be treated as public authorities under RTI, and even then, only regarding the use of those funds. This material alteration significantly narrows the scope of information disclosure.

Furthermore, a fortiori, the new RTI ambit under NSGA effectively exempts BCCI (India’s wealthiest NSB) insofar as it does not take direct government funding, and one can reasonably predict that it will continue to do so notwithstanding the mandatory recognition that BCCI will now have to secure.

In view of the foregoing, let us recap the landmark Zee Telefilms case, often hailed as the ‘Magna Carta’ of Indian sports law jurisprudence, wherein it was held in the context of BCCI that albeit it does not fall within the purview of “state” under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, notwithstanding, it is amenable to Article 226 and subject to judicial review, insofar as it performs a “public function” which may at times affect the fundamental rights of individuals. This rationale was categorically reaffirmed in a plethora of other cases, for instance, inter alia, in Ajay Jadeja v. Union of India; Rahul Mehra v. Union of India; Amrit Kumar Dhankar v. Union of India; BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar; and Narinder Batra v. Union of India.

The above dicta were again reflected in 2018 by the Central Information Commission (“CIC”), acting as the apex appellate body under RTI, which affirmed that the status, nature, and functional characteristics of BCCI satisfied the conditions under Section 2(h) of RTI. However, the CIC’s order was rendered ineffective after the BCCI secured a stay order from the Hon’ble High Court of Madras.

It is pertinent to note that while BCCI does not receive direct budgetary support, it indeed enjoys substantial indirect benefits, including but not limited to – sweeping tax exemptions, custom duty concessions, and access to public land at subsidised rates for stadiums.

In this sense, the authors are of the opinion that while the inclusion of NSBs under RTI (albeit in limited fashion) is a step towards cleaner governance, the exemption carved out for bodies such as the BCCI is undeniably a compromise that undercuts accountability.

Executive Levers

Notably, there exist certain executive levers for more comprehensive carve-outs under NSGA which merit attention. Section 34 confers wide powers upon the Central Government to exempt an NSB or its affiliate altogether from the scope of NSGA “in the public interest” in consultation with the Board and the concerned IF. Indeed, this is a broad and textually structured discretion; while the consultation requirement and public interest reasoning serve as guardrails, the amplitude remains significant.

Further, in accordance with Section 35, the Union may issue directions to the Board or “any other person or entity” for efficient administration of NSGA and may impose “reasonable restrictions” on participation of a national team or any individual in national sports under extraordinary circumstances in the interest of national security, public order and safety. This is another statutory national-interest override, and one can only hope that its use will be rare, proportionate, and reasoned.

Moreover, Section 37 clarifies that NSBs are to be primarily guided by international charters, and where a conflict with NSGA exists, the Central Government may, after consulting the Board and the relevant IF, issue a clarificatory notification. The clause is drafted as a harmonisation mechanism.

Last but not the least, while the scope of analysis of the present article does not cover in detail the constitution of the Board, the National Sports Tribunal, as well as the Election Panel, for the sake of completeness, one must briefly underscore that ultimately, these bodies are nothing but creations of and appointments by the Central Government.

Given this context, what emerges is a real risk of NSGA being read less as mere regulation and more as sweeping executive control (given the scope of powers rendered upon the said oversight bodies) that may breach the principles of autonomy and independence observed by IOC and most IFs. There is no denying the fact that Indian NSBs have historically suffered episodes of third-party interference and accordingly, bans by IFs; ergo, the NSGA, if not applied with restraint, may once again draw the ire of IFs.

Conclusion

To wit, India’s new sports playbook undeniably ushers in much-needed reforms, at the same time raising questions about implementation and enforcement. Practically, many NSBs will need to overhaul their constitutions and practices to meet the stringent requirements under NSGA. The promises of a more “athlete-centric” system will depend on whether athletes and independent professionals genuinely get a say, or if old power networks find ways to retain control.

Enacting the law is one step; enforcing it is another. NSBs might attempt to find loopholes or seek stays on certain provisions and judicial intervention may once again be required. As to the executive levers, a key question that remains is whether NSGA tips the balance too far – in other words, whether in attempting to correct the shortcomings of opaque NSBs, NSGA risks an overcorrection, vesting disproportionate authority in the executive, which may have severe repercussions.

NSGA, therefore, should be acknowledged not as a finished product but as a foundation of reform. Its true success will depend on careful implementation, the cultivation of genuine independence for oversight bodies, not to mention a more participatory, consultative approach to amendments. Only then can India strike the right balance between autonomy and accountability in its sports system, avoiding the twin perils of executive overreach and international censure.

*Ria Mishra is a Lawyer with the Technology and Transactions Team at DSK Legal’s New Delhi office. She has a strong interest in the evolving technology, gaming, and sports sectors in India, with particular focus on advising new-age technology companies and startups on new business models as well as raising funds.

*Aakash Batra specialises as a Sports Lawyer at 14 Sports Law, an international boutique law firm based in Portugal. His focus lies in the Litigation Team at 14 Sports Law, handling sports-related disputes and arbitration, primarily before the FIFA Football Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in addition to national-level sports dispute resolution bodies, including the instances of the All India Football Federation.