*Tarsh Khanna

This paper critiques India’s National Sports Governance Act, 2025, highlighting its welfare-oriented reforms alongside risks of excessive governmental control. Analysing provisions on national bodies, athlete representation, the National Sports Board, and recognition frameworks, it argues that centralisation jeopardises federation autonomy and international compliance, urging reform tempered with independence to avoid sanctions.

The National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (‘NSGA’) came into force on 18 August 2025 with the stated objective of reforming sports administration in India. It seeks to bring transparency, accountability, and athlete welfare into a system long criticised for inefficiency and opacity. On paper, these reforms appear timely. As someone who routinely represents professional footballers in disputes before the All India Football Federation (‘AIFF’) and FIFA, I can see why the Act has been welcomed in policy circles.

But the big question is whether or not the NSGA really improves sports in India, or exposes it to the danger of debasing the autonomy that international governing bodies such as FIFA and IOC consider indispensable. The footballing community in India is well aware of the dangers. Only three years ago, in 2022, FIFA handed the AIFF a “third- party interference” suspension. More recently, FIFA and the Asian Football Confederation extended the AFIF’s deadline to adopt its constitution to 30 October 2025. A repeat indication of government meddling could see the suspensions reinstated, with potentially damaging consequences for players and clubs.

This article will examine four core areas of the NSGA, establishment of national bodies (Section 3), athlete representation (Section 4), the National Sports Board’s sweeping powers (Sections 5–7), and the recognition/registration framework (Section 8). While there are genuine welfare gains, the risks of political interference remain substantial.

The National Sports Board: Centralisation or Control?

Sections 5–7 create the National Sports Board (‘NSB’), a body corporate that is vested with extensive powers. It can give recognition to sports federations, keep registers, make inquiries and even set up ad hoc bodies to supersede “non-compliant” organisations. It is also responsible for managing the welfare of athletes and safe sports policies, as well as working with international partners. The measures theoretically could make governance more efficient. Indian football has struggled for years with slow funding, inadequate protection for young athletes and a fragmented administration. The NSB’s protective role concerning athletes’ rights is under Section 6(i) but equally important is what might become the Safe Sports Policy provision in Section 6(f). These could close longtime gaps in categories including medical coverage, anti- harassment procedures and grassroots development.

The problem is controllability. The Central Government appoint the Chairperson and members of the NSB (Section 5) and staff too are to be appointed in consultation with it (Section 7). Such concentration of appointment powers is a recipe for politicising the body. The statutes of FIFA expressly demand that national associations be free from government interference. Should the NSB choose to exercise its recognition powers in a manner suggestive of state influence, Indian football could find itself facing sanctions at the hands of FIFA once again. The example set by the 2022 ban illustrates how real and present a danger this is.

Athlete Representation: Progress or Tokenism?

Section 4 presents the case for mandatory athlete representation in the governance of national sports. Executive Committees will now need to have a minimum of two top athletes, two members of the Athletes’ Committee and at least four women. Age limits, term limits and cooling off periods are also prescribed. Theoretically, these reforms can unlock opportunities for the players to have a hand in decisions. For football, it might mean a closer examination of overdue wages, insurance shortfalls and the sense of financial instability among players in the Indian Super League and I-League. There’s also the progressive requirement for women’s representation, in light of the persistent under-resourcing of women’s football. Yet whether these provisions are effective is arguable. Athlete representation is a feature in most cases, with voting power decided by the bye-laws of the particular federation. A demand for “outstanding merit” and experience of previous service could act as a barrier to young voices on their way into governance. In the absence of meaningful voting strength and protections against dilution, representation will be mostly ceremonial rather than transformative.

Establishment of Bodies: Affiliation Facade?

Section 3 sets out the structural architecture of sports governance in India. It provides for the establishment of four categories of entities: the National Olympic Committee (‘NOC’), the National Paralympic Committee (‘NPC’), a National Sports Federation (‘NSF’) for each designated sport, and a Regional Sports Federation (‘RSF’) for each such sport (Section 3(1)). Exclusivity is built into the system. Sub-section (2) requires that there “shall be only one” NOC and one NPC. Sub-sections (3) to (5) mandate that the NOC, NPC, and NSFs must secure recognition and affiliation from their respective international governing bodies (IOC, IPC, and the relevant international federation, e.g. FIFA for football). Sub-section (6) extends the same principle to RSFs, subject to “prescribed” affiliations under future regulations.

On the surface this would seem reasonable enough. It sets the table because it establishes a single authority by discipline, there will be no overlapping authorities. For stakeholders, it may translate into less litigation over recognition and more clear- cut accountability, most notably in decision-making related to where competitions are held, how funding is allocated, and which athletes get selected. The international affiliation stipulation also fits in with international norms whereby the Indian federations are not left out of the world‘s sporting system.

But, on the other hand, its imposing structure is a form of imprisonment. The imposition of one NSF per sport ignores the dynamics of sporting ecosystems, which frequently grow based off splinter groups/experimental formats/emerging disciplines. Esports, adaptive sports and indigenous games are just three examples where a one-size-fits-all body model could be unfeasible. The exemption in Section 3(5) reflects recognition that some sports don’t have international regulating bodies; unfortunately, the exemption is limited and lots of disciplines fall outside this opening. The dependence on “prescribed” instances under Section 3(6) adds a degree of indeterminacy which would leave RSFs in the lurch until such time as regulations are formulated.

The implications are substantial. The requirement of continuous international affiliation effectively ties national legitimacy to external validation. If that federation loses or fails to gain recognition, the immediate repercussions might include loss of funding, cancellation of competitions, and evacuation of an athletes’ pathway.

The underlying critique is that Section 3 prioritises uniformity and stability but fails to account for adaptability. There’s no bridging mechanism for younger or emerging sports; no method by which provisional and aspiring bodies who are in the throes of affiliation could receive recognition; and there is nothing to stop a diversity of sporting concepts being excluded. The result is a structure that may consolidate power at the national level but risks marginalising state and grassroots voices.

Recognition and Registration: Streamlining or Overregulation?

Section 8 states that NSB recognition is a condition for sports federations. The bodies have to be registered as societies, companies or trusts with renewals that would be regulated. Associates also have to be admitted, and preferential recognition is given to established organizations such as the AIFF. This would be a step toward long overdue organization in the mess that is Indian football’s affiliate system, where state bodies often compete for recognition and funding. But it also has the potential to create new bottlenecks. The renewal requirement, if too frequent, could overwhelm smaller affiliates with compliance costs. The need for prior government approval for promotional organisations (Section 8(7)) adds another layer of control that could politicise even grassroots initiatives. The requirement for the approval of a government official before any promotional body (section 8(7)) is established introduces an additional layer of control, potentially exposing even quite spontaneous activity to political intervention.

A Bright Spot Amid the Concerns

The NSGA does have a few positives that shouldn’t be overlooked. The sections dealing with athlete welfare, especially Sections 4 and 6, mark a step in the right direction. For instance, the National Sports Board’s role in working with international bodies (Section 6(h)) and ensuring athlete rights and welfare (Section 6(i)) could finally bring in some much-needed structure. If implemented properly, this might mean better funding for academies in Tier-2 cities, giving young players opportunities without putting their families under constant financial pressure.

Another provision worth noting is the Safe Sports Policy (Section 6(f)). For too long, there has been little by way of formal safeguards against harassment or exploitation, particularly of minors. Having a policy framework here, even if basic, is an overdue step. Added to this is the inclusion of athlete representatives on executive committees (Section 4(1)(b)), which could slowly push federations like the AIFF towards more transparent and fair decision-making.

None of this is a silver bullet, but it does create the beginnings of an institutional framework that can be built upon. For players, coaches and even administrators, these changes present a rare chance to improve welfare and governance in a system that has resisted change for far too long.

Conclusion: Reform with Risks

With the NSGA, we have to be cautiously optimistic. Its athlete welfare, safe sports and representation sections are lessons learned from past failures. It’s also aiming to create a level of consistency and accountability within sports bodies, many of which have seemed too resistant to drag themselves out of the dark ages. But its centralising ethos gives government too much control. Without clear autonomy clauses, independent oversight and a firmer balance of the rights of those involved in sport, the Act is in danger of making precisely the mistakes it was designed to rectify. Reform is needed, but it needs to be tempered with independence. If Indian sport has to succeed at the world stage, institutional structures must enable athletes and federations and not let politics rule.

*Tarsh Khanna is a Partner at Sensato Legal and an international sports lawyer representing clients before FIFA, CAS, and national tribunals, while also advising on regulatory and commercial matters. He regularly delivers lectures on sports law, and works closely with players, coaches, and clubs across jurisdictions.