*Shauryaveer Chaudhry

The National Sports Governance Act, 2025 is India’s first comprehensive law on sports governance, with major consequences for cricket. This article argues that the Act does not dismantle the BCCI’s entrenched power but instead shifts it towards excessive executive control. By reversing Lodha Committee reforms on tenure and age limits and creating a National Sports Tribunal vulnerable to political influence, the Act risks further politicising cricket governance. While intended as reform, it substitutes private monopoly with state dominance, leaving Indian cricket exposed to reputational costs internationally and perpetuating longstanding problems of opacity and weak accountability.

The newly enacted National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“Act”) brings several significant changes to the framework of sports governance in India. This is the first Act on a nation-wide scale that seeks to regulate sport governance in India, despite several policies already being formed for the same in the past. The Indian Constitution lists sport under the broad umbrella of entertainment (List II Entry 33) which States had to promote and develop.  

Through this article, I argue that the Act enables the transformation of a private oligarchy in Indian sports governance to a situation of excessive state influence on the sport  The internal power structure of the BCCI initially functioned as an oligarchy which externally translated to a monopolistic control over the market in the economic sense.  The Act thus does not dismantle concentrated authority but rather realigns it, tethering the BCCI’s autonomy to the preferences of the Government.  This creates a sphere of sports governance that is highly politicised by both parties – the government as well as the BCCI.  However, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on the sport of cricket for several reasons in order to understand and predict the potential conflicts that may arise between the International Cricket Council (“ICC”) and the Board of Cricket Control in India (“BCCI”) as a consequence of this Act. First, the sport is already highly politicised in India; second, the sheer attention it enjoys in India naturally ensures that the BCCI under this act would remain in the limelight. This article assumes that the BCCI, under the new Act, is considered as a National Sports Body and differs from its previous stance as a completely private entity. 

I begin by establishing that the earlier regime followed an oligarchic nature of sports governance.  Further, I demonstrate how the Act undoes the Lodha Committee reforms. Then, I discuss problems with the Act, specifically with the National Sports Tribunal (‘NST’).  

For the purposes of this article, private oligarchy denotes the concentration of power and control in the hands of a small, exclusive group of individuals. Monopoly, within the context of this article, refers to the tendencies of the BCCI towards other similar bodies that have substantially lesser power and backing. An example of such tendencies is the control they have exerted in shifting all of their matches in the 2025 Champions Trophy from Pakistan to Dubai, which put the Indian team at a significant advantage over the various other teams.

I – BCCI as a Private Oligarchy

Before the enactment of the Act, BCCI functioned as a private oligarchy. Power, in cricket governance in India, is neither widely shared among stakeholders nor is it subject to meaningful oversight. The sport of cricket enjoys an enormous fanbase in India.  However, the nature of the governance in Indian Cricket is often perceived as feudal and archaic by the Indian audience and the larger public.

The primary example demonstrating BCCI’s monopoly over the structure of cricket in India is the backdrop and handling of the Indian Cricket League (“ICL”). The saga began in 2004, when the BCCI seemingly arbitrarily cancelled ZEE’s tender for media rights for the ICL that they had won with a bid of $308 million against ESPN STAR Sports’ bid of $240 million. BCCI claimed that it succumbed under pressure from Cricket Australia and the ICC to take such a hurried and haphazard decision. While ZEE’s relatively new entry in the cricket media industry has also been cited as a reason in court, interestingly, neither ZEE nor ESPN fulfilled the necessary requirements of the BCCI to telecast a live cricket match.  This controversy thus shows how BCCI exercises its control over the rest of the cricket fraternity. This led to ZEE forming the ICL in 2007, coinciding with the first ever ICC T20 World cup when the ZEE Enterprises-sponsored ICL tried to kick off operations in the same year.

After the Australian Cricket Board’s horrific experience with Kerry Packer’s World Series Cricket between 1977 and 1979 where Kerry Packer tried to begin his own series to rival the Australian Cricket Board and the ICC, the BCCI was adamant about not letting its stronghold over Indian cricket be diluted. When the ICL attempted to enter the market for private professional cricket, the BCCI already exercised control over both the upstream market of regulating and managing the game of cricket in India and the downstream market of organising domestic tournaments and franchise-based leagues. It was able to use this position to adopt measures that created barriers for the ICL at every stage, including access to players, stadiums (which were primarily government owned) and sponsorships. Due to these restrictions, the ICL, despite being launched with substantial financial backing, was unable to operate in a market that is completely controlled by the BCCI.  This episode illustrates how the BCCI’s market power extended across multiple levels of cricket administration and organisation, enabling it to suppress potential competition.

The BCCI also has a history of discarding players and captains that may not be politically connected or have opposite affiliations. In 2021, Hanuma Vihari was dropped after an innings filled with extraordinary determination in Sydney. This is not an isolated issue (see here and here). The issue I raise is not with the dropping of Vihari or any other player, but rather the manner in which it was done. In order to curb any issues regarding the governance of the team, there needs to exist a clear and transparent form of communication between the BCCI and its players.  However, when no reason and no clear communication is there, in cases such as this and the removal of Virat Kohli as ODI captain in 2021, where the players publicly acknowledge a lack of transparency with the BCCI and offer contradicting statements to the BCCI’s stance in the media, it becomes clear that the BCCI is being run by the top brass in a manner that cannot be justified to the general public at large.

The oligarchic structure of the BCCI raises several concerns with sports governance in India. Firstly, the absence of external accountability mechanisms meant that decision making processes are shielded from public scrutiny. This is problematic since Section 2(G) of the BCCI Constitution enshrines the team chosen by BCCI as the official representative of the Indian cricket team. The ICC also recognises this authority of the BCCI. This has created a disjuncture of sorts where a body is exercising functions and obligations in public interest but operates under the cloak of private autonomy.

Secondly, the oligarchic nature of governance has significantly distorted the market for cricket. As already demonstrated by the ICL suppression, BCCI’s dual role as a regulator and organiser allow it to suppress competition and further entrench its position. This concentration of power leaves the entire Indian cricketing fraternity at the mercy of unilateral decisions that may be taken by the BCCI in a potentially arbitrary manner.

Finally, this private oligarchy has fostered a sense of patronage and opacity in selection and appointment processes, which has been demonstrated in the cases of Hanuma Vihari and Virat Kohli. This private arrangement of the BCCI, therefore, has systematic consequences for the credibility of cricket governance in India.

Going ahead, I will explore how this private arrangement of the BCCI has changed within the framework of the Act.

II – Undoing the Lodha Committee Recommendations

The establishment of the Lodha Committee led to massive shockwaves within the BCCI. The richest sporting body  in the country was opened up for investigation to an independent authority.

The Lodha Committee found a highly politicised model of functioning within the BCCI and the manner in which the BCCI interacts with its state associations (pg.50). The committee found several disputes that were a result of gross mismanagement. Players have been used as pawns in political games between associations (in the states of Jammu & Kashmir as well as Delhi specifically). This demonstrates my argument from Part I that till now that the BCCI has been functioning as a private oligarchy.

The Lodha Committee recommended that the BCCI President should not be allowed to work for more than 2 continuous terms and that retirement age should be fixed at 70 (pg.102). However, Section 4(2)(E) of the Act allows the members of the Executive Council to be 75 years of age. This is in contradiction with the suggestions of the Committee record and may stand to jeopardize the quality of cricket governance in India. Studies have shown that age dissimilarity may lead to decreased satisfaction due to poor communication channels between older leaders and younger members. This is further compounded by the fact that cricket players do not usually tend to play past the age of 40, but however, the Act allows the age of the members of the Executive Council to be 75. This will lead to a disconnect between those administering the sport and the players that are actually playing the game.

Further, the term limit recommended by the Committee has also been done away with under the proviso to section 4(2)(b), which allows for three consecutive terms to serve in the Executive Council of a National Sports Body and a further cooling off period of one term.

It is also interesting to note that the BCCI continuously rejected the Lodha Committee  recommendations and refused to accept the changes suggested in its entirety, which the Committee claimed were binding on the BCCI. The BCCI has repeatedly claimed that the Committee’s recommendations are not binding on itself as an independent association and thereby rejected the reforms.

The control of the sport has switched from the private nature of the BCCI to the Executive by handing major power, especially in matters of dispute resolution to the Executive. Previously, important members connected to the Executive have held key positions within the BCCI, most noteably Jay Shah(son of India’s Home Minister).  This presents a different set of concerns that are equally troubling.

Executive control risks politicizing cricket governance. Appointment of tribunal members through committees tied directly to the Cabinet blurs what the line should be between the sport of cricket and politics. Cricket administration now risks being susceptible to partisan interests rather than independent oversights. Executive dominance corrodes institutional autonomy. This may disincentivise accountability within cricket itself. Administrators of the sport may defer to political masters rather than engaging in genuine reform thereby replicating the pre-existing problems of opacity, patronage and lack of accountability that had already plagued the BCCI in its oligarchic form.

Therefore, the Lodha Committee’s recommendations have been ignored and cast away by this Act, and similar problems from the past are still present in the mode of functioning of the BCCI. What this essentially implies within the framework of this Act is the BCCI will not be under true scrutiny for its manner of governance and decisions to the extent that the functioning of the BCCI aligns with the Executive. The previous opaque functioning of the BCCI will be further worsened by the manner in which the Executive is now tied with BCCI.

III – The Tribunal’s Tyranny

The Act, under section 17, establishes the National Sports Tribunal(‘NST’).  The members of this tribunal are appointed on the recommendation of a Search-Cum-Selection committee that consists of:

1. Chief Justice of India or a judge from the Supreme Court that is appointed by the Chief Justice
2. Secretary to Government of India in the Ministry of Law and Justice
3. Secretary to Government of India in the Department of Sports

While the secretaries to the Government of India may be administrative members, they may themselves not be free from executive control. These secretaries are appointed by the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet under Schedule 1(Rule 6[1]) and its annexure of the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961. This committee consists of the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, and may include a third minister. Therefore, the appointment of Secretaries for the Ministry of Law and Justice and Department of Sports is a political process under the direct control of the executive. This will undoubtedly lead to the politicisation of the NST under the hands of the executive. The Supreme Court in Madras Bar Association V. Union Of India has maintained that tribunals must remain free from executive power, must be composed primarily by judicial members and this begins with the appointment of the members of the tribunal(para 14).

Thus, this appointment process for members of the Search-Cum-Selection committee for the NST is blatantly politicised and problematic.

Another clear example of executive tyranny under the Act is Section 18(1)(B). It allows for the removal of the chairperson (judicial member) or other members of the tribunal who have been convicted for an offence which involves ‘moral turpitude’ in the eyes of the central government. However, the threshold and standard of what constitutes this moral turpitude may vary and this provision is at a high risk of being misused by the Central Government. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has noted that the definition of moral turpitude in Indian law may be vague (para 28). The Court holds that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Such cases may have to be decided depending upon the facts of each given case. Moreover, “moral turpitude” means conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, and it is not determined by the gravity of punishment. The standards for what constitute this, therefore remain vague within Indian jurisprudence.

The Act has excessively delegated the authority to determine what constitutes disqualifying conduct to the executive. This is especially dangerous when the same executive already controls the appointment process for tribunal members. The likelihood for selective application by political actors clearly poses a threat that undermines judicial independence and public confidence in the neutrality of sports dispute resolution.

This provision should be situated within the broader architecture of the Act. The NST was introduced as a corrective measure  to the opaque functioning of sports bodies.  In principle, an independent dispute resolution mechanism promised to check the excesses of private monopolies and bring fairness and transparency to sports governance.  An independent dispute resolution mechanism is now used consistently to check the excesses of private monopolies and to inject fairness and transparency into a system long dominated by opaque decision-making . Therefore, it can be reasonably inferred that NSTs have been introduced as a corrective measure. Yet, giving the Executive these excessive powers risks converting neutral safeguards to disciplinary weapons of the government.

It must be noted that the NST is a separate entity from the BCCI and they remain formally distinct bodies. However, this tyranny of the tribunal does pose problems in the manner in which the BCCI may operate in the future. Disputes that were once exposed the BCCI’s oligarchic excesses are now filtered through a tribunal structurally beholden to the executive. BCCI retains its governance powers over cricket in matters of selection, administration, organisation of matches, etc. However, The NST has the final say in disputes about how those powers are exercised. The BCCI may align its decisions with governmental preferences to avoid adverse rulings. The converse, however less likely, may also be true where the rulings of the NST are used to curb BCCI autonomy. Under the new regime, the BCCI retains its internal concentration of power, but the executive has acquired an external lever of control through the NST. The danger is not in the BCCI losing its power. It rather lies in the fact that this same power is now contingent on state approval which risks politicising the sport.

IV – Conclusion

The National Sports Governance Act alters the governance of cricket in India from an entrenched private oligarchy to an equally problematic system of executive overreach. By enabling political influence over tribunals, discarding Lodha Committee safeguards, and centralising control in state hands, the Act jeopardises both autonomy and accountability.  The BCCI is left vulnerable to governmental interference.

The ICC has rules against political influence in the cricket boards of nations, most notably from Article 2(4)(D) of its Articles of Associations. While the BCCI was run by private individuals in an oligarchic manner, there was no government interference warranting sanctions under Article 2(4)(D) till now. ICC has sanctioned boards when governments directly dictated cricketing decisions such as selection, board appointments or suspension of administrators. The Act allows the government to shape the tribunal that adjudicates cricket disputes. A sanction, in all practicality, is unlikely to happen since the ICC and BCCI are interdependent on each other for their economics. Moreover, there is a clear distinction made between the governance of cricket and dispute resolution of sport under the aforementioned rule of the ICC Articles of Association. Thus, despite increasing executive interference between the Act, the BCCI would likely not face any repercussions in the international cricket governance arena.

Even if sanctions under Article 2(4)(D) are, in practice, unlikely given the economic interdependence of the ICC and the BCCI, the structural risk remains critical. The BCCI may not be in strict violation of the ICC rules, however, the Act exposes Indian cricket to reputational costs and potential challenges within international governance which will not be looked at favourably by the ICC. This vulnerability is itself significant and may mark a shift in the manner in which cricket is governed internationally and the preferential treatment that the BCCI currently enjoys.

Instead of reforming cricket governance, the Act shifts power without addressing structural flaws. True reform must insulate sports from both private monopolies and political dominance, ensuring independent, transparent, and accountable governance.

*Shauryaveer Chaudhry is a second year B.A. LL.B. student at the National Law School of India University.