*Shrushti Mahesh Taori and Tatva Hemal Damania

(Source: Wikipedia Commons)

Street vendors, Mumbai’s most accessible service providers, face arbitrary evictions and poor implementation of safeguards. This article critically examines the 2014 Street Vendors Act and judicial interpretations, and also analyses policy gaps and poor implementation that hinder effective protection. It concludes with recommendations for a more inclusive and accountable urban governance framework.

Mumbai, the Maximum City, thrives on the energy and enterprise of its street vendors, entrepreneurs in the informal economy who serve as the city’s most accessible service providers. From bustling markets to roadside stalls, they contribute significantly to the local economy, accounting for approximately 14% of non-agricultural urban informal employment in India. However, elite NGOs and residents’ associations have increasingly promoted the idea that hawkers impede Mumbai’s development into a ‘world-class’ city. Vendors face financial challenges, as evident from the fact that 59% of vendors borrow money at exorbitant interest rates (5–10% per month), often for social security needs like healthcare and education, leading to debt traps. Moreover, long working hours ranging from 8 to 12, extendable to 15 per day,[i] coupled with poor working conditions, contribute to health issues such as hypertension and respiratory problems due to pollution exposure. Women vendors, in particular, face additional challenges, including a lack of access to sanitation facilities and heightened safety concerns.

The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (“BMC”) often cites concerns over congestion, hygiene, and aesthetics, and hence, continues to conduct periodic evictions and crackdowns on the street vendors. Some of the other reasons are like drastic reduction in the proposed number of zones from 488 to 187 by the court-appointed committees, non-operational Town Vending Committees (“TVCs”),  and vendors being blamed for accidents, congestion, or urban disorder.

The Vendors resist the relationship between them and the state, which is often marked by exploitation and fear. One such reason is that the threat of change in zones or demolition is regularly used by the state to extract higher payments from the vendors. Even temporary judicial suggestions, such as listing an area as a non-hawking zone,  trigger extortion.[ii] Vendors acknowledge that state power is not about enforcing legal order but about keeping them in a perpetual state of legal uncertainty, which enhances their vulnerability and maintains the flow of informal payments.[iii] Moreover, the state often refuses to resolve the hawking issue. This preserves a system of continuous rent extraction, which eventually benefits low-level officials who depend on the perpetuation of informality.

These strategic ambiguities are central to the politics of street vending in Mumbai. Hence, a proper analysis of laws and policies governing street vendors in the city and their implementation becomes paramount. This article critically examines the legal and policy challenges faced by street vendors in Mumbai. It analyses the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 (“the Act”), along with its judicial interpretations, to understand how the law has been applied in practice. The article further explores the ground-level implementation gaps and systemic issues that hinder the effective protection of vendors’ rights. Lastly, it concludes by offering recommendations aimed at providing a more inclusive and accountable urban governance framework.

The Legal Framework of The Street Vendors Act, 2014

Vendors hold two distinct property-related interests: first, the right to vend in public spaces allocated for that purpose, and second, ownership of movable assets such as carts, stalls, and inventory. To address these issues, Parliament enacted the Act, which promises to shift this narrative from eviction to inclusion.

The Act replaced the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Bill, 2012, and sought to institutionalise a participatory, rights-based framework. Some appreciable provisions of the act include mandatory enumeration of vendors every five years (S. 3), issuance of vending certificates without a numerical cap (S. 3(3)), and a requirement of thirty days’ notice prior to any eviction or relocation (S. 18 (3)). It also mandates the formation of TVCs with vendor-plurality representation and independent Grievance Redressal Committees chaired by retired judicial officers.

A major shortcoming of the Act is that it relies heavily on subordinate legislation, empowering states to make rules and other local governing bodies to make by-laws. As a result, even if the framework is introduced, as it is in Maharashtra, it is frequently violated by the local authorities and police. The law’s implementation remains discretionary in the hands of the authority, which leads to slow and uneven implementation of the act.

The progress so far? –

As of 2020, data from 259 towns of Maharashtra, which have implemented a program, indicate that 257 have only provisional TVCs in place, and no town has constituted a regular committee with elected vendor representatives. Only 97 towns (37%) have completed vendor enumeration, identifying approximately 75,000 individuals out of which none of whom have received vending certificates or identity cards. A mere 12 TVCs have submitted vending plans, only one town has demarcated vending zones, and no Grievance Redressal Committees have been established.

How does the Judiciary look at it?

The Delhi High Court limited the definition of “street vendor” to include on three pre-2014 official lists. Other courts introduced additional requirements absent from the statute, such as the Himachal Pradesh High Court introduced the requirement of domicile to include in the definition of ‘street vendor’. In contrast, the Kerala High Court interpreted the Act more broadly, which extends protections to all vendors, even if their enumeration or certification is pending according to the criteria of the Act.

Courts have also upheld ‘No-Vending Zones’ established prior to the 2014 Act, and evicted vendors, despite statutory provisions that bar eviction and relocation until the enumeration is complete. Another approach, as visible in several cases, is where evictions were sanctioned based on vaguely defined “public interest” considerations such as infrastructure development or national security, without actually considering relocation or rehabilitation.

Judicial interpretation of the Act’s “overriding effect” as mentioned in Section 33 of the Act, which provides that the provisions of the Act shall prevail over any existing law, has also been narrow. For instance, the Madras High Court prioritised the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 over the Act. Similarly, the Gujarat High Court denied protection to vendors occupying unauthorised permanent structures.

Approaches to procedural deferral have also varied across the Courts. In Vijay Kumar Sahu v. NCT Delhi, the Delhi High Court referred a dispute to a non-functional TVC without granting interim relief. Conversely, in Dwarka Sector-6 Vendors Association v. SDMC, the same court resolved the matter independently based on factual findings.

The Courts have refused to entertain challenges to eligibility lists. Hence, while the introduction of the act is an appreciable step, the everyday experience of street vendors, particularly women, Dalits, and child vendors, continues to be marked by marginalisation, harassment, and systemic exclusion.

Thus, it can be clearly observed that uneven and sometimes contrasting opinions are delivered by the courts, leading to inconsistent interpretation of the act, which further exacerbates the discretionary and uneven implementation of the act.

Policy Challenges in the Governance of Street Vending in Mumbai

Apart from the legal uncertainties, the Street vendors face how policies are designed and implemented. For example, the existing legal and policy discourse treats vendors as a monolithic group. It overlooks internal differences and hierarchies within the sector. Vendors are often conceptualised simply as “the vendor,” and ignore the differentiated experiences of specific social groups. For example, Dalit women and child vendors face distinct and more intense forms of exploitation and vulnerability. While the laws and policies look at them equally, they rarely consider the social dimension of vending or the layered nature of precarity in this workforce.

Hence, this section looks at four major policy-level concerns. It examines problems in the election of TVC members, issues in vendor surveys, conflicts over vending zones, and barriers in licensing caused by inactive committees.

Election of Town Vending Committee Members

TVCs are the bodies established under the act to oversee the regulation of street vending, including vendor registration, zone allocation, and policy formulation. In Mumbai, the BMC is responsible for constituting eight TVCs, comprising one apex committee and seven zonal committees, each with 20 members, including eight elected hawker representatives. This is in accordance with Section 22 of the Act, where at least 40% of the total seats are reserved for members elected directly by street vendors.

However, this election process, which was intended to ensure vendor representation, has encountered significant obstacles. On August 29, 2024, elections were held to elect 64 hawker representatives across these committees, with 32,415 eligible voters participating at 42 polling stations. However, the process was marred by controversies over the voter list’s validity. Hawker unions, such as the Mumbai Hawkers Union, criticised the BMC for reducing the number of registered vendors from over 1.28 lakh surveyed in 2014 to approximately 22,000. This excluded many eligible vendors from voting, and voter turnout was merely 49.46%.  Several writ petitions were filed in the Bombay High Court against this exclusion. Although the Bombay High Court refused to halt the elections, the Supreme Court intervened and directed that the declaration of results be halted till the petition filed by the Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union is disposed of.

Survey and Identification of Street Vendor

Accurate surveys are foundational to the implementation of the act, as they ensure the identification and registration of vendors and grant them legal status. However, such survey processes have never been short of contentions. Reports indicate that while over 1.28 lakh vendors were initially surveyed, the BMC’s electoral list for the 2024 TVC elections included only 22,000 vendors. This led to concerns about the survey’s comprehensiveness and credibility. Hawker unions argued that the survey systematically and essentially failed to account for vendors who availed loans under the PM SVANidhi scheme.

The flawed survey has had cascading effects. By excluding a significant portion of vendors, it has limited their ability to participate in TVC elections, access licenses, and secure designated vending spaces. The Bombay High Court, in February 2025, questioned the BMC’s reliance on the 2014 survey and raised concerns about the exclusion of over 70,000 verified voters. Thus, this highlights the need for a fresh survey. Additionally, the lack of updated data hampers the BMC’s ability to formulate effective policies for the street vendors.

Vending Zone Allocation and Resident Complaints

The allocation of vending zones is a critical aspect of the regulation of street vendors, which is aimed at balancing vendors’ livelihoods with urban planning needs. The Act mandates consultation with vendors, police, and public stakeholders before modifying vending zones, but this process is rarely followed. This results in decisions that prioritise resident demands over vendor rights, who viewed them as a nuisance.  Surprisingly, even the judiciary and policy makers and law enforcers view street vendors with such bias. In Mumbai, however, this process has been contentious, with zones often designated in undesirable locations without adequate vendor consultation. For instance, a 2018 BMC proposal to allocate 85,000 hawking pitches was met with opposition from party corporators, who viewed vendors as a nuisance. This led to its cancellation and a call for a new survey.

The vending zone allocation and urban planning is further complicated by complaints from the residents. For example, in Bandra’s Hill Road, pressure from local residents in 2023 relocated 45 licensed stall owners to the Pali municipal market and displaced 200 other stall owners in different parts of the city. Similarly, in Mahim, a recent incident further sheds light on residents’ frustration over illegal vendors obstructing footpaths and causing traffic congestion. They also accused BMC of its inaction due to alleged bribery.

Hence, these incidents reflect an existing tension between vendors and residents, often contributed to by BMC’s failure to designate vending zones that accommodate both parties’ needs.

Licensing Issues and Non-Operational Town Vending Committees

The licensing system for street vendors in Mumbai is a significant barrier to their legal operation. Vendors often prefer formal recognition, because they seek protection from a predatory state.[iv] Unlike in some Western contexts, where licenses may invite stricter surveillance, in Mumbai, formalisation is viewed as a buffer against arbitrary violence. Mumbai has a license cap of approximately 15,000 for an estimated 250,000 vendors, based on the norm of 2.5% of the city’s total population, as prescribed in section 3(2) of the Act, and consequently, the majority of them operate illegally.Research suggests that the vendors spend 15-20%, extendable to 35-40% to avoid harassment, of their daily income on bribes, because they fail to procure the license.  

Moreover, provisional TVCs, formed in the absence of elected representatives, lack vendor input. This leads to decisions that fail to address their needs. The absence of functional TVCs stalls critical processes like license issuance, zone allocation, and policy enforcement. This forms a vicious cycle of marginalisation for vendors.

Conclusion

As Mumbai moves forward with grand visions of global urbanism, the role of hawkers in shaping the city remains deeply contested. Activists and vendors alike challenge elite visions promoted by groups like Bombay First and CitiSpace, which invoke global templates without accounting for local realities. Yet hawkers remain resilient, grounded in decades of service and rootedness in the city’s public life. Rather than obstacles, they are stewards of the urban commons, whose participation is crucial in imagining a more inclusive future.

The state government must urgently set up fully functional, democratically elected TVCs in all zones. Electoral rolls should be updated through fair and inclusive surveys, independent of political or bureaucratic influence. Vending zones must be planned in direct consultation with vendors and local communities. These decisions should reflect a balance between economic rights and public concerns, not just the preferences of elite residents.

Licensing limits must match the actual number of vendors in the city. A simple, transparent process should replace the current opaque and exclusionary system. Grievance redressal must be time-bound, easily accessible, and run by independent bodies. Courts must interpret the 2014 Act with its purpose in mind, as a welfare law meant to protect livelihoods. Vendors are not obstacles to order; they are essential to Mumbai’s economy and social life.

As Jane Jacobs rightly said, “Cities have the capability of providing something for everybody, only because, and only when, they are created by everybody.” the inclusion of street vendors, our very own creation, is not just a legal obligation; it is central to the idea of a fair and humane city.

                                                            ******************                                                     

[i] Reeju Ray, “Right to the City: The Street Vendors Act of 2014 and the Collective Struggles of Women Vendors”, Special Article, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 57, Issue No. 26-27 (June 25 2022).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

*Shrushti Mahesh Taori is a final-year student at Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur. She has a deep interest in Indirect Taxation and enjoys critically interpreting the law and engaging with the technical complexities of the subject, particularly in litigation contexts.

*Tatva Hemal Damania is a penultimate-year student at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. He particularly enjoys discussing, deliberating, and critically analysing contemporary developments in law and policy.